The Problem of Freedom Override by Digital Rights Management Technologies:
the Market Mechanisms and Possible Legal Options

Abstract
One of the major problems of copyright regulations in the digital and network era is
that the Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies are overriding the freedom
incorporated within the copyright regulations in the analog world. The override
problem partly comes from the strict implementation of the DRM systems by the
market, and partly from the anti-circumvention regulations that almost blindly protect
such implementation. This research reviews the scope of anti-circumvention
regulations by introducing Japanese regulations, which are rather modest, and by
comparing with the U.S. regulations. It also extensively analyzes the market
mechanisms that cause rather strict implementation of DRM systems based on
interviews of key persons in the market. At the end, it suggests several legal options to
improve the problem of freedom override by DRM technologies, either by direct legal
means or through market mechanisms, to keep a better balance of interests between
right-holders and users of copyrighted information.

1.

Introduction
Digital and network technologies have dramatically changed the world of

copyright. They are used not only to exploit and distribute copyrighted works, but also
to control the usage of copyright, often referred to as Digital Rights Management
(DRM) technologies. One major problem is that the DRM technologies are overriding
the freedom incorporated within the copyright regulations in the analog world. Even
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worse, such override is often supported by the anti-circumvention regulations which
prohibit the circumvention of DRM technologies. This problem has been discussed
rather extensively,1 however, we still do not see a substantial improvement. This
article is to research the reason of this slow change, and to suggest possible
improvements in law to assist the solution to this problem of overriding freedom.
This article uses two approach that has not been seen in the past. One is to provide
lessons learned from comparing contemporary copyright regulations in the U.S. and
Japan. Japanese scholars have not been particularly active in discussions about the
digital dilemma, especially outside the Japanese domestic forum. This is a pity,
because Japanese regulations are relatively unique and different from those of the U.S.
in several material respects. By explaining the Japanese legislation and comparing it
with the U.S. regulation, it shows the flexibility in implementing the two WIPO
Treaties in 1996 (the WIPO Copyright Treaty [WCT], and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty [WPPT], which are collectively referred to as the 1996 WIPO
Treaties), and how the difference impacts the society.
Another contribution this article attempts to make is including some of the voices
from the market in the course of the analysis. Copyright regulations, digital and
1

See, infra note 15, 18.
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network technologies, and market (business model) and social norms (i.e., people’s
perceptions about copyrighted works) are becoming more closely related to each other
in the digital and network environment. Previous research in the field, however, does
not contain enough clear and verbatim expression of the thinking and ideas of people
currently working in the marketplace. This article includes quotes from these
interviews and conference remarks, in order to illustrate the thoughts and experiences
which are actually forming the practice in this growing field on a daily basis. 2
Through these interviews, this article analyzes the reason why the implementation of
the DRM technologies tend to be restricting, and concludes that it is rather difficult for
the market to self-correct this unbalanced implementation.
At the end, using these two research methods, this article suggests the following
three possible options to change the anti-circumvention regulations. One is to repeal
the current anti-circumvention regulations when the implementation of the DRM
technologies fail to consider the balance. It also analyze why repealing part of
2

The author conducted many interviews of the key players in the digital networking fields to get their
views. Included are executives and other businesspeople in Internet-related businesses, including
right-holders, content providers, vendors, and systems designers. The interviews were conducted as free
discussions; i.e., the author presented topics and asked the interviewees to discuss what they cared about
or what concerned them the most about each topic. The author felt that this would be a reasonable way
to avoid asking possibly biased questions. The results were recorded and transcribed. Interviews in
Japanese were translated into English by the author. The transcripts presented in this article may have
been edited on a grammatical level, but not further. Some of the remarks are from major conferences in
the research field. The actual speeches were recorded and transcribed by the author. All the positions or
titles that appear in this article are the ones at the time of the interview.
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anti-circumvention regulations may not be as problematic as it may appear. The second
is to expand the exemption to anti-circumvention regulations, or “the right to hack.”
The third is to support the effort to incorporate the freedom within copyright regime
into the DRM systems by tailoring copyright law.
Section 2 briefly describes the problems caused by DRM technologies: the
problem of overriding freedom. Section 3 introduces the anti-circumvention
regulations over DRM technologies in the U.S. and Japan, and the problems caused by
these regulations, with special attention to the difference between Japan and the U.S.
Section 4 studies some reasons for biased DRM implementation based upon interviews
of the key players in the DRM arena, and analyzes whether such unbalanced
implementation could be improved by market mechanisms. Section 5 looks into legal
tools that might help solve the problem of overriding freedom. Section 6 concludes
this article.
2.

Brief Overview of DRM Technologies
Although there are many definitions of DRM technologies,3 this article will refer

collectively to technologies that control access to or exploitation of digital materials as
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See., Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 Am. J. Comp.
L. 323, 324 n6 (2004).
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“DRM technologies.” More concretely, encryption, watermark, metadata (especially
“rights expression languages,” or “REL”) are among the technologies that are heavily
used to control access to and exploitation of digital materials. Some systems can allow
copyright owners to control users’ ability to view or listen to materials (access control).
The same systems, or different ones, can control users’ ability to print, copy, download,
upload, perform, distribute, modify, or otherwise exploit digital materials in a manner
that is regulated by copyright law (usage control).4
2.1

Pros of DRM Technologies
Overall, DRM technologies are thought to be an important enabler of new business

models by right-holders and content distributors. First, DRM technologies can reduce
the nonexclusivity of intangible content. Copyrighted works are often claimed to be
public goods in an economic sense, which results in an undersupply of those goods in
the market.5 Using DRM technologies, one can, at least in part, fix the problem of
nonexclusivity.6 This can turn digital content into a marketable good. Second, as a
result, DRM technologies help right-holders generate different business models for the
4

See, Bill Rosenblatt et al., DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY (M&T Books
2002). See, also, Bechtold, Id. at 326-31.
5
See, e.g., PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 593 (Prentice Hall 5th ed. 2000).
6
Of course, if there is the same content available without any restrictions, DRM systems that are partly
applied to the content cannot eliminate the problem of nonexclusivity in a complete manner. However,
because of the transaction cost to get the unrestricted content, content providers still form a market with
people who are willing to pay for the DRM-employed content.
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same content. For example, DRM technologies can enable a price-discrimination
model in a more secure way by combining technologically enforced usage restrictions
and prices. If based on an economic judgment that a price-discrimination model
increases social welfare by reducing deadweight loss compared to monopoly without
price discrimination, DRM may be said to help increase such social welfare by
sustaining such price-discrimination models.7
Third, DRM-based transactions are often claimed to reduce the transaction cost of
content distribution in various ways, if designed wisely and properly.8 It can reduce
the costs of rights clearance by providing a direct license online, and enable direct
distribution along with monetary transactions from creators to end users without an
intermediary.9
Finally, DRM technologies may be able to provide protection (or security) to make
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There is an important suggestion made by Wendy Gordon, however, that such “increase of social
welfare” brought by price discrimination is only when compared to a monopoly market without price
discrimination. Gordon warns that price discrimination does not legitimatize the shift from free use to
controlled use with price discrimination, as free use often provides more social welfare than monopoly
that is required as prerequisite to price discrimination. See, Wendy Gordon, “Intellectual Property as
Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract” (Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory), 73
Chi. Kent. L. Rev. 1367.
8
However, the actual effect of reducing the transaction cost heavily depends upon the design of the
DRM systems that are actually implemented. If poorly designed, they may even increase the transaction
cost. For example, badly designed DRM players will take a great deal of time and energy for users to
install and handle, and impose high cost on service providers to provide users’ support.
9
Direct distribution is more the fruit of network technologies than of DRM technologies. However,
DRM technologies actually help enable businesses by providing payment mechanisms or increasing
nonexclusivity.
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content providers feel safe enough to release their content. 10 For example, NTT
Docomo, a Japanese company that first in the world created the mobile content
distribution business model, explained that one of the reasons for their success was
technological protections. Toshihiro Kuwabara, a member of the legal department of
NTT Docomo explains:
The concept [of i-mode business] is to provide superior service at a low
price. For example, downloading ring-tones costs 300 yen. We asked
content owners to provide a low-priced license based on the fact that
handsets are designed to prohibit copying of ring-tones among users.
The fact that users are incapable of transferring ring-tones is a very
important point in making the price inexpensive.11
Bob Ohlweiler, Senior Vice President of Business Development at Musicmatch, an
online Windows-based music store, explains the importance of providing a secure
system as follows:
The bottom line is [that] we live in a world now where you can take a
piece of valuable content and make unlimited numbers of perfect copies
of it, so we go back to the problem which I believe is solved, which is,
convincing the people who own the content to let us commercialize it in
a digital medium. But part of the deal was you have to keep it somewhat
safe from that kind of mass piracy.…Without DRM …, it will be very
difficult for us to convince all the rights holders to give us access to
commercialize the contents.12

10

However, this effect heavily depends upon how much security content owners ask in order to release
their content. Often times, the level of security that content owners ask is very high, or not precise that it
creates a lot of confusion and loss in the market of technology research and development.
11
Interview with Toshihiro Kuwabara, NTT Docomo, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 20, 2002).
12
Bob Ohlweiler, Address at Digital Hollywood Spring 2005 (Mar. 30, 2005)
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Content owners agree. Amanda Marks, Senior Vice President of eLabs at Universal
Music Group, made it clear: “We are not going to sell our content in an unprotected
format.”13
2.2

Cons of DRM Technologies and New Problems
As DRM technologies can have several positive functions in content distribution,

they also create several concerns and problems. One of the problems that DRM
technologies override and diminish the freedom incorporated in the copyright regime,
as described below.14
2.2.1

Diminishing Freedom Incorporated into the Copyright Regime

There are four categories in which “freedom of speech” is reserved within the
copyright law:15 (1) idea/expression dichotomy; (2) copyright exemption such as fair
use (in the U.S.) and copyright limitation statutes (in Japan); (3) copyright duration;
and (4) what is outside the scope of copyright protection. Courts have acknowledged
such freedom within the copyright regime. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
13

Id.
There is another whole set of problem regarding privacy, which is outside the scope of this research.
For details, See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, What the publisher can teach the patient: intellectual property
and privacy in an era of trusted privication, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1201 (2000); Jonathan Weinberg,
Hardware-Based Id, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1251 (2000); MARK
STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE: SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR A NETWORKED WORLD
197-231 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
15
See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer in his article, Does Copyright Abridge The First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech And Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970), Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev.1 (2001).
14
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Harper & Row,16 declared that First Amendment protections are “already embodied in
the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by
fair use.”17
However, DRM technologies, by being implemented and enforced in a way that
overrides the legal rules set by copyright law, diminish these freedoms.18 It can
enclose the public domain, or can eliminate the copyright exemption. The conflict with
fair use and other non-infringing uses created by DRM technologies is well recognized
even by the U.S. courts.19
In addition, DRM technologies that are used to control people’s access to
copyrighted work override the principle of “free access” in copyright law. Such
phenomena were hardly observed in the analog era, simply because it was very costly
to do so. You are free to walk around and peep into books that you are interested in, or
can even read the entire book without violating copyright regulations. However, such
16

471 U.S. 539 (1985).
471 U.S. at 560.
18
See, e.g., Bechtold, supra note 3, Yochai Benkler, Free as the air to common use: First Amendment
constraints on enclosure of the public domain, 74 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Mark A. Lemley and
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of speech and injunctions in intellectual property cases, 48 Duke L. J. 147
(1998), Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in
Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981 (1996).
19
See, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub
nom. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F. 3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
17
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freedom either is not granted or is very limited when it comes to DRM-protected
works.20 As a result, it reduces a chance for people to be exposed to many kinds of
information, or at least biases the kind of information that people can freely access.
2.2.2

Two Sources of the Override Problem

These problems of DRM technologies overriding freedom within the copyright
regime come primarily from two sources: one from the manner in which the DRM
technologies are implemented, and the other from the difference between computers
and human beings as decision makers.
The problems of overriding copyright “freedom” can be partially avoided when
DRM technologies are implemented in a considerate way. Usage rules designed to
implement DRM technologies can be loose enough to respect the “safety valve” inside
the copyright law: for example, allowing some private copies; allowing content to be
transferred to a friend and family; excluding the public domain from the portfolio with
DRM protection; and allowing as much preview as possible before purchase.21

20

Many kinds of DRM-software are available for document control. See, e.g., Adobe,
http://www.adobe.com/security/main.html,(last visited April 25, 2006); DRM functions in Microsoft
Office 2003, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/office/office2003/maintain/rmsirm.mspx,
(last visited April 25, 2006).
21
For an attempt to create or define such user-friendly rules in the DRM implementation, see, Digital
Media Project, http://www.dmpf.org/, (last visited April 25, 2006). It states, as one of their mission, to
map rights and usages traditionally enjoyed by users to the Digital Media space. See,
http://www.dmpf.org/manifesto/dmm.htm#3.1.1., (last visited April 25, 2006).

10

Michael Miron, the CEO of ContentGuard, Inc., makes this point clear:
[One] misleading assertion … is that somehow DRM will necessarily
erode consumer rights such as fair use and first sale…. There is a fair
amount of belief that DRM somehow is going to take away legal rights
necessarily, and therefore we have to ban it, stop it, undermine it, no
matter what. This is misleading. DRM certainly can be misused in this
way, but … this is really a systems’ implementation issue…. [Y]ou can
use, for example, the MPEG well to create a license grant to mimic fair
use for particular domains.22
However, so far, copyright owners and content providers tend to provide usage
rules that are much less flexible than what was possible under the copyright law in the
analog world.23 Whether this problem can be solved by the market will be analyzed
below in Section 4.
Secondly, even if copyright owners and users of copyrighted works fully agree to
set very flexible DRM usage rules, there still remains a problem of whether DRM
technologies are capable of providing the same freedom as was allowed in the analog
setting. The control and judgment made by computers and human beings (especially
judges) are different in nature. Especially, DRM technologies can behave only as they
are programmed, and are not good at considering the purpose or the situation of the
use. Given such nature, Section 5 suggests to combine human intelligence with
22

Michael Miron, Opening Keynote Speech at Digital Rights Management Strategies 2004 conference
(April 13, 2004).
23
See, e.g., Bechtold, supra note 3 at, 340 footnote 84, 344-6 (explaining that DRM technologies are
often used to enforce strict contractual terms).
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computers to embody the freedom properly within the DRM system.
3.

Anti-circumvention Regulations in the U.S. and Japan
If DRM technologies are causing this override problems, one of the easy solutions

would be to take away the cause of the problems: i.e., to circumvent DRM
technologies when problematic. However, such a solution is prohibited by the
anti-circumvention regulations. “Anti-circumvention regulations,” in a narrow sense,
usually refers to two kinds of regulations. One is the “direct circumvention
regulation,” which prohibits the acts of circumventing technological protection
measures, such as “usage control” and “access control.” The other is “anti-device
regulation” (or “indirect circumvention regulation”), which regulates production
and/or dissemination of devices and/or information that allows people to circumvent
technological protection measures. Here, “usage control” is referred to as
technological measures that control the usage or exploitation of works for which
copyright owners have rights defined in copyright law (such as rights to reproduce,
modify, distribute, or perform). “Access control” is referred to as technological
measures to control people’s access to copyrighted materials (including viewing,
reading, and listening to the materials).
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Legislators also decided to prohibit alteration of copyright management
information, 24 which is often referred to as “copyright management information
regulations.” This article collectively refers to these two regulations using the
expression “anti-circumvention regulations,” unless otherwise indicated, to make the
argument simple, because their functions and problems overlap with each other in
many areas.
Anti-circumvention regulations have their bases in the 1996 WIPO Treaties, which
require contracting parties to provide legal protection remedies against “the
circumvention of effective technological measures” 25 and “rights management
information.”26 In the U.S., Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) in 1998 in order to implement the 1996 WIPO Treaties.27 For the same
reason, Japan amended the Copyright Law 28 and Unfair Competition Prevention
Law29 in 1999.
In the following, this Section describes the substance of anti-circumvention
24

Here, “copyright management information” refers to information attached to copyrighted work for
the purpose of managing copyright, including metadata such as REL description of licensing terms,
names of right-holders, and copyright terms.
25
WCT Article 11 and WPPT Article 18.
26
WCT Article 12 and WPPT Article 19.
27
17 U.S.C. Chapter 12.
28
Article 2 Paragraph 1 Items 20 and 21; Article 30 Paragraph 1 Item 2; Article 113 Paragraphs 3 and
4; Article 119 Item 1; Article 120 bis items 1, 2, and 3; and Article 123.
29
Article 2 Paragraph 1 Items 10 and 11, and Article 2 Paragraphs 5 and 6.
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regulations, with an emphasis on explaining the Japanese regulations and comparing
between the U.S. and Japan (3.1), and some pros and cons of anti-circumvention
regulations (3.2 and 3.3).
3.1

Substance of Anti-circumvention Regulations

3.1.1
3.1.1.1

Direct Circumvention Regulation
Japanese Regulations

In Japan, the scope of direct circumvention regulations is very limited compared to
that of the U.S. in two major aspects: the scope of protected technologies and the effect
of violation.
First, in terms of protected technologies, Japanese copyright law protects only
usage controls, and not access control.30 Article 2 Item 20 of the Copyright Law of
Japan defines “technological protection measures” as “measures to prevent or deter
such acts as constitute infringements on moral rights or copyright … or neighboring
rights.”
According to the legislative history, the rationale behind this limitation is that

30

See,

[Daisuke Yoshida et al., Part I: Amendment of the Copyright
Law, in COMMENTARY ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION LAW ], 95 (Research
Group for Copyright Law & Section for Intellectual Property Policy at the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry ed., Yuhikaku 1999).
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copyright law should support only established rights entitled in the law, but nothing
further. It is stated that, because copyright owners do not have a right to monopolize
mere access to copyrighted works by people, protection of access control technologies
should be outside the scope of the Copyright Law.31 Nobuhiro Nakayama, Chief of the
Copyright Council for the legislation of anti-circumvention regulations, explains why
the legislation avoided regulation over access control: “because regulating people’s
access [to information] includes a broader problem that is beyond the issue of
protecting property: that is, academic freedom, freedom of speech, right to access,
etc.”32 He recognizes voices that express concerns about the practical efficiency of the
regulations because of the “lack of protection toward access control.” However,
Nakayama explains that the legislation chose the moderate or prudent regulation on
access “because the issue of controlling access to information has an enormous impact,
good or bad, for the society in the information age to come. Therefore, a long-term
careful discussion is necessary.”33

31

See,

10
12
10
[the Multi-media Subcommittee of the Copyright Council, the Final
Report of the Working Group regarding Technological Protection and Control] dated December 10,
1998, Section 2.4, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/12/chosaku/toushin/981201.htm#2-4,
(last visited April 25, 2006). However, it is questionable whether the distinction between usage control
and access control ban be made clear.
32
See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at ii.
33
Id.
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Second, situations in which direct circumvention of usage control technologies is
prohibited are very limited. Circumvention of usage control by users is prohibited only
when users do so in order to make private usage of protected works (which is
otherwise exempt from copyright under Article 30).34 In sum, circumvention of usage
control only causes the loss of statutory exemption regarding private copies and
modification of such works (thereby making circumventor liable for reproduction and
modification of the work). 35 Circumvention for the purposes of other statutory
exemptions, such as reproduction in libraries, quotation, and educational purposes, is
generally regarded to be allowed under Japanese copyright law.36
Because the scope of regulation is very limited, especially because it does not
regulate access control, there is no statutory exemption regarding the direct
circumvention regulations in Japanese copyright law.
3.1.1.2

Difference between the U.S. and Japan

The largest difference between the direct circumvention regulation in the U.S. and
Japan is whether it includes access control. Although the U.S. Federal Circuit
34

Of course, the resulting copyright infringement which became possible because of the circumvention
of usage control is regulated by traditional copyright law, which is not a direct effect of circumvention.
35
Article 30 Paragraph 1 Item 2 of the Copyright Law of Japan.
36
See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 95. In such a case, although not clearly stated, reproductions
necessarily made in the course of exempted uses should be also exempted regardless of Article 30
Paragraph 1 Item 2.
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recognizes the principle of free access under copyright law,37 it concludes that it was
Congress’s intention to prohibit circumvention of access control that leads to the
exploitation of copyright.38 On the other hand, Japan decided not to regulate direct
circumvention under copyright law, paying full respect to the principle of free access.
The second difference is the respect for copyright exemptions. In Japan,
circumvention for the purposes exempted under copyright law is allowed, thereby
giving exemptions priority over the regulation of circumvention. This issue is treated
in a more unfriendly manner for users in the U.S.39
The conflict between fair use and anti-circumvention regulations had already been
recognized at the time of legislation in the U.S.40 For example, the Second Circuit
states that §1201 (c)(1) does not justify circumvention for the purpose of fair use.41
Therefore, as Ginsburg points out, §1201 (c) is “irrelevant” to the problem of
diminishing fair use chances.42
Difference in culture or social norms between the two countries may have some
37

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1197-1203.
39
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, (1999)
40
3
[Hideki
Nokata, The Optimal Use of Copyright Management Information and Its Problems] 443 footnote 13
(2001).
41
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001).
42
See, Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 8,
(2000).
38
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influence in the different treatment regarding the “right to hack for fair use.” Although
an amendment to allow people to “hack for fair use” has been proposed in the U.S., it
was unsuccessful because of the concerns of the “misuse” of such a right. As Kevin
Saul, Director of the Trademark, Copyright & Corporation, Marketing and Legal
Department of Apple Computer, Inc. says:
If we state fair use as a right, I think there would be more abuses of
copyright. It is different from “Well, it could be an infringement, or
could be fair use.” Because that is how I support the business people.
They are very loose minded on fair use. It really helps to say to them,
“look, if we are not sure it’s fair use, it’s an infringement.43
Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager of the Planning Department, Network
Application & Solutions Division of Sony Corporation has a similar impression:
[Our DRM design called] “Open MG” is based on specifications
decided in SDMI.44 Therefore, you can check in and check out content
to portable devices three times. In Japan, when we released the Open
MG, both end users and right-holders accepted the rule almost without
any opposition or resistance because it is based on SDMI. However, in
the U.S., there is still resistance in the market. We have already released
the devices in the U.S. market, but both media and users give us
comments or complaints like “why is there such restrictions?” I don’t
know whether such a difference comes from cultural differences, or
whether the U.S. people have a stronger feeling toward Fair Use
“rights.” Anyway, I feel a real difference.45
43

Interview with Kevin Saul, Director, Apple Computer Inc., in Cupertino, Cal. (Nov. 20, 2003).
The Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) is a forum of more than 200 companies to discuss data
protection of digitalized music in the world of digital and network technologies. It released
technological specifications in 1999-2001, but was never widely implemented as a common commercial
platform. See, http://www.sdmi.org/ (last visited April 25, 2006).
45
Interview with Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager, Sony Corporation, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 17,
44
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3.1.2

Anti-device Regulation (or Indirect Circumvention Regulation)

3.1.2.1

Japanese Regulations

It is a strange twist that Japan is very modest regarding direct circumvention
regulations while rather aggressive regarding anti-device regulation. This is mainly
because of the amendment of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (UCPL), the
idea of which was to “protect the services that rely on access control,” while regulation
under the Copyright Law is as modest as direct circumvention regulation is.
3.1.2.1.1

Copyright Law

In Japan, the scope of anti-device regulations is also limited under the copyright
law. In terms of protected technologies, anti-device regulation also focuses only on
usage control and not on access control. The rationale is the same as that for direct
circumvention regulations described above.46
The scope of acts that are regulated is narrower than most other implementation
examples. The key points are: (a) devices are limited to those with the “principal
function” of circumventing technological protection measures, which is narrower than
devices with “only limited commercially significant purpose for use other than”

2002).
46
See, supra Section 3.1.1.1.
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circumvention in the U.S.; (b) the dissemination is limited to the public; and (c)
remedies are granted only through criminal procedures.
To explain in more detail, the definition of devices that are regulated is a “device
having a principle function for the circumvention of technological protection measures
(such a device includes such a set of parts of a device as can be easily assembled) or
copies of a program having the principal function circumvention of technological
protection measures.”47
And the efforts that are regulated under anti-device regulations are: (1) to transfer
to the public the ownership of; (2) to lend to the public; (3) to manufacture, import or
possess for transfer of ownership or lending to the public; or (4) to offer for use by the
public those circumventing devices.48 Manufacturing such a device and transferring a
copyrighted work to a specific person does not constitute a violation of this regulation.
The reason for limiting device regulation to actions toward the public is to limit the
regulation to actions that have a large impact on the interests of copyright owners.49
In addition, there is only a criminal statute and there is no civil remedy for the
violation. According to the official commentary, this is because copyright owners can
47
48
49

Article 120 bis Paragraph 1 the Copyright Law of Japan.
Id.
See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 97.
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anticipate the circumvention of usage control of copyrighted materials at the time of
manufacture or offer of the circumventing devices, and thus it is regarded that the
interest of the copyright owner is not mature enough to be granted civil remedies based
on specific copyrighted materials.50
3.1.2.1.2

Unfair Competition Prevention Law

As can be seen above, anti-device regulation is rather limited in the Copyright Law
in Japan. However, the National Diet at the same time amended the UCPL to regulate
circumventing devices for access control, based on an approach of competition
regulation rather than of copyright protection.51 That is, in the UCPL, the anti-device
regulation is much broader compared to that under copyright law as described above.52
First, it is broad in a sense that the anti-device regulation under the UCPL includes
both usage control and access control. The idea is to protect the businesses of content
providers who charge fees for providing technologically controlled content, and from

50

Id. at 99.
The official commentary explains that the UCPL does not regulate the act of circumvention (by using
circumventing devices) because such circumvention would be difficult to find and would give less
damage compared to the commercial sale of the devices. See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 244.
52
Article 2 Paragraph 1 Item 10 of the UCPL defines as unfair competition: commercially transfer,
display for transfer, export and import of devices and software program; and public transmission of
software program; that has the sole function of circumventing technological measures commercially
employed to control the access and copy of images, sounds and software programs. Item 11 prohibits the
same conduct listed in Item 10 for the purpose of circumventing technological protection measures
commercially employed on services that allows specific audiences to access or copy images, sounds and
software programs. [Official English translation of the UCPL not available.]
51
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this perspective, the distinctions between usage and access that are relevant under
copyright law are not competent.
Second, the regulation in the UCPL lacks a distinction between copyrighted
materials and the public domain, because this regulation is designed to be outside the
copyright regime. From the perspective of unfair competition among content providers,
it is claimed to be unimportant whether the distributed materials are copyrighted or not.
Any kind of digitalized materials can be commercial goods for fair competition.
Therefore, it does not matter whether the materials the entrepreneurs provide are
copyrighted or not. Content providers who are providing others’ copyrighted materials
or even materials in the public domain can seek civil remedies based on the UCPL.
Third, the UCPL does not limit the entitled persons to copyright owners: all
entrepreneurs using controlling technologies for their business (mostly broadcasters
and other content providers) are entitled to seek injunctions and/or damages. This
means that even a non-exclusive licensee (distributor) of copyrighted works, who is
not entitled to exercise copyright, can assert and enforce protections toward
circumventing devices under the UCPL.
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The UCPL has only one statutory exemption for “testing and research.”53 The
article is very simple. It states that to assign, transfer, display, export, import, or
provide over the Internet the circumvention devices or programs “for the purpose of
testing or research regarding technological protection measures” is exempt. There is no
detailed limitation regarding the definition of “testing” and “research,” as is the case in
the DMCA. The official commentary explains that the aim of the exemption statute is
to ensure free and competitive activities targeted toward developing more sophisticated
technological protection measures.54 The exemption is intended to include all of the
following activities: testing and research done by the service providers alone, or
together with device manufacturers for developing new technologies; testing and
research for validity and vulnerability of technologies currently used in the service or
to be used in the future service; and testing and research done by content owners to
ensure the effectiveness of the protection measures, or comparing the pros and cons of
the several technologies that may be applied to their content.55
However, the commentary also explains that it was a deliberate decision of the
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Article 11 Paragraph 1 Item 7 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law of Japan.
See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at 252-253.
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legislators not to have any other statutory exemption.56 With regard to exemptions for
law enforcement or other government activities, the legislators decided them
unnecessary because circumvention devices provided for such purposes cannot be
regarded as “unfair competition” and, therefore, are not regulated under the UCPL in
the first place. The legislators also talked about creating a statutory exemption to
respect the copyright limitation statutes, but they finally decided not to. Their reasons
were: (a) circumvention devices could create considerable economic loss to content
owners if misused, and (b) legitimate and acceptable uses would not be regulated
under the UCPL because such uses would not cause “commercial damages” large
enough to be regulated under the UCPL.
3.1.2.2

Difference between the U.S. and Japan

In terms of regulated devices and information, anti-device regulation is broader in
Japan than in the U.S. in two aspects. First, although limited to commercially based
activities, technological protection measures are protected even when applied to the
public domain under the UCPL in Japan. However, this difference does not make a
large difference in practice, because, in most cases, the same technologies would be
used to protect copyrighted as well as public domain works, and it is very hard to
56

Id. at 253 footnote 25.
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imagine a device that circumvents technologies only when protected works are in the
public domain, given the current situation where there is no systematic ways to mark
the difference between the public domain and copyrighted works. Therefore, the
devices that are regulated under the UCPL in Japan would probably be also regulated
under the anti-device regulations in the U.S.
Second, Japanese anti-device regulations have a broader scope of regulation in
terms of persons entitled to the claim, i.e., the UCPL protects content providers (or
licensees and distributors) in addition to copyright owners, while in the U.S., it
protects only copyright owners.
On the other hand, there are several points where the U.S. anti-device regulations
seem to be broader. First, both copyright law and the UCPL in Japan limit controlled
devices to those whose “principal function” is to circumvent protection measures. In
the U.S., devices that have “only limited commercially significant purpose for use
other than” circumvention are also regulated, which is tailored in a broader manner
than in Japan.
In the U.S., some cases ruled that anti-device regulations are even applicable to
devices that have several different functions, one being “only limited commercially
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significant purpose for use other than” circumvention, but others being legitimate.57
Even though this issue has not yet been heavily tested in front of the court, if this trend
continues, there may be a clear difference in scope of anti-device regulations between
the U.S. and Japan. Though not yet ruled by the courts, if the requirement of the
“principal function” being circumvention of protection measures is interpreted as “no
other significant functions,” multiple-functioned devices may be exempted under
Japanese anti-device regulation. The answer remains to be seen at this point in time.
Second, the regulated devices in the DMCA may cover a broader scope of tangible
or intangible goods, or at least causes some ambiguities as to what kind of goods are
regulated. As described below,58 the RIAA once alleged that even an academic paper
discussing a security hole regarding watermarks can be a “technology” regulated under
the anti-device regulations in the U.S. This would not happen in Japan, as both
copyright law and the UCPL make it clear that they regulate tangible devices or their
57

See, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, 22-23 (D. Wash. 2000)
(quoting Nimmer & Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (1999 Supp.), 12A.18[B], stating that “a given
piece of machinery might qualify as a stable item of commerce, with a substantial noninfringing use,
and hence be immune from attack under Sony's construction of the Copyright Act- but nonetheless still
be subject to suppression under Section 1201.”); followed by Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1037 (D. Ill. 2003) (“Indeed, in the RealNetworks case, the court was
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product that circumvented the protective measure was enough to violate the DMCA.). This
interpretation is also supported by Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F. 3d 1178, 1198
(Fed. Cir. 2004), although given a different fact, they concluded differently.
58
See, Felton case described in infra Section 3.3.2.
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parts and computer software, thereby avoiding some chilling effects.
Third, under the DMCA, manufacturing even a single device can be illegal. In
addition, statutory exemptions are very narrowly defined. On the other hand, under
Japanese copyright law, anti-device regulations prohibit only activities targeted toward
the public. This means that, under Japanese copyright law, a hacker (whether a good
researcher or a bad pirate) can do their “research” and try to develop and design a
device that circumvents DRM technologies without permission, as long as the hacker
does not engage in mass-scale activities. This would explain why Japanese copyright
law does not have exemptions for scientific research, security testing, or other
legitimate activities. The UCPL, on the other hand, regulates distribution of a single
device as long as such distribution is made for commercial purposes. However, the
UCPL has a broad, general exemption statute that includes almost all kinds of “testing
and research” regarding technological protection measures. Therefore, Japan is overall
friendly to scientific research.
3.1.3

Copyright Management Information Regulation

Another regulation that legally supports technological controlling measures is the
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“copyright management information (‘CMI’) regulation.”59 The CMI regulation is
also an implementation of the requirement of the 1996 WIPO Treaties.60
Metadata, such as terms and conditions of use and information about copyright
owners, are protected under the CMI regulation. Included are metadata written in REL
and other contractual languages used in DRM systems.
The scope of CMI regulations in the U.S.61 and in Japan62 are similar. In addition
to the obligations set forth in the WIPO Treaties, both the DMCA and Copyright Law
of Japan prohibit people from providing false CMI.63
As there are not any distinct cases that have tested CMI regulations in either the
U.S. or Japan, it is rather difficult to determine the real scope of the regulations.
However, because CMI regulations prohibit changing metadata, including REL
descriptions, and because REL is one of the major components of the DRM
technologies, CMI regulations can have almost the same impact as the rest of the
anti-circumvention regulations.
3.2

Pros of Anti-circumvention Regulations

59

17 U.S.C. §1202, Article 2 Paragraph 1 Item 21 and Article 113 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Copyright
Law.
60
WCT Article 12 and WPPT Article 19.
61
17 U.S.C. §1202.
62
Article 2 Paragraph 1 Item 21 and Article 113 Paragraphs 3, 4 of the Copyright Law.
63
17 U.S.C. §1202(a), Article 113 Paragraph 3 Item 1 of the Copyright Law.
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The merit of anti-circumvention regulations is that they can add protection to the
DRM technologies as business enablers. As Nobuhiro Nakayama points out, for
example, every DRM technology is destined to be broken, and, in practice, given the
acceptable cost to be spent on DRM technologies from a business perspective, content
providers often have to put up with DRM technologies that are not strong enough.64
Therefore, he concludes that providing legal protection to DRM technologies is
necessary for the growth of a “healthy” information society.65
It also helps add deterrence to break DRM technologies with the intention of
pirating copyrighted works. To form this point slightly differently, it may help
right-holders to release more content in a digital form by providing additional
protections. For example, Shiburo Tokano, Manager of the Musical Copyright Section
of the Intellectual Property Division at Yamaha, states that technological protection
measures and deterrence added by anti-circumvention regulations are very important
for ring-tone providers, as the data of ring-tones are very small and easily distributed.66
3.3
3.3.1
64
65
66

Cons of Anti-circumvention Regulations
Impact on Overriding Problems: Fixing problems created by DRM

See, Yoshida et al., supra note 30 at ii.
Id.
Interview with Yoichi Misawa, Assistant Manager, Yamaha, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 24, 2002).
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Technologies
However, anti-circumvention regulations, both in the U.S. and Japan, are also
causing problems by fixing the problem DRM technologies are causing by blindly
protecting any kind of DRM systems/designs.
For example, the Second Circuit declared in the Corley case that circumventing
DRM technologies even for the purpose of fair use is not permissible under the
DMCA.67 This means that the DMCA is fixing the problem of diminishing the benefit
of or adding cost to fair use. Realizing that copyrighted works with analog output can
be recaptured and used, the Second Circuit states that “the DMCA does not impose
even an arguable limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair
uses.”68 However, Corley does not refer to cases where analog output is not available,
such as use of computer software codes.
In Japan, the problem of overriding some freedoms is less problematic, as
circumvention is allowed under copyright law if it is made for the purpose of uses
exempted by law. However, this “freedom to hack” is helpful only for technologically
savvy people who have enough knowledge and skills to circumvent DRM technologies.
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273 F. 3d. at 443.
Id. at 459.
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Those who are not technologically savvy need to have a tool to make the necessary
circumvention. Therefore, the anti-device regulations create unfairness between the
technologically savvy and non-savvy.69
3.3.2

Impact on Scientific Research: Chilling Effect

In the U.S., anti-circumvention regulations can create a chilling effect on scientific
research, especially in the field of security research. This is because the basic manner
of security research is for researchers to investigate security problems, discuss them
among themselves, write code to fix the problems, and test and challenge such codes
with each other.70 If the circumvention itself is generally prohibited, they are not able
to do research.
Because in the DMCA the statutory exemption for conducting research is narrowly
tailored, it has been claimed that it causes a chilling effect.71 The famous case is the
“Felten” Case, where Princeton Professor Edward Felten once withdrew from
presenting his paper about the security hole because of a threat based on the DMCA.72
69

Benkler, supra note 18 at 416.
See, Brief of Amici Curiae of S. Bellovin, M. Blaze, D. Boneh, D. Del Tronto, I. Goldberg, B.
Schneier, F. A. Stevenson, D. Wagner, in Corley, 26 January 2001,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/crypto-amicus.html, (last visited April 25, 2006).
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Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect at Cryptography Research, describes the
chilling effect created in the field of security research as follows.
I understand the motivation behind [the DMCA]. I understand that
studios don’t want their content stolen, and I agree that content
shouldn’t be stolen.
However, DMCA is actually bad for security. The reason for this is:
DMCA makes it illegal to build bypass equipment, for example. Of
course, they have carve outs for research and those kind of things, so
you are supposed to be able to do it for these reasons anyway, but
working for a security company, let me tell you, that has scared us away.
No one wants to test that.
We used to, before DMCA, break things all the time. We wouldn’t
release them publicly, but we would get things in, evaluate them, find
the security faults, and figure out how to be able to fix them or what
people are doing security-wise, and that was generally good for security.
Security works by people breaking stuff. That’s how the industry works,
and if you look at the publications from the cryptography conferences, I
pick up any of these books and you’ll see people breaking algorithms,
and someone else introducing a new algorithm in the same book and
that goes on constantly. That’s how we’ve worked as a community.
DMCA has been bad from that perspective; it does stifle research
regardless of the intent. We were not surprised by [the Felten case when
it happened].73
3.3.3

Impact on Developments of Devices, Services, and Software

In the U.S., because of the narrowness of the exemptions for reverse engineering,

http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/(last visited April 25, 2006).
73
Interview with Carter Laren, Senior Security Architect, Cryptography Research, in San Francisco,
Cal. (Apr. 8, 2005).
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encryption research, and security testing, it has become much more difficult to design
new devices or new services that require reverse engineering, testing, and research
without being chilled by the DMCA.
Also, in both the U.S. and Japan, it has become even more difficult to provide
devices or services that provide interoperability with DRM-protected devices or
services. Even a device provider who provided transmitters for a garage-door opener
was sued under the DMCA.74 Without having permission from either DRM providers
or copyright holders, it is almost impossible to provide interoperability under the
current regulations, except for the very narrow exemption of §1201 (f) in the U.S.
In addition, anti-circumvention regulations have a huge impact on software
development. For example, in the U.S., a Russian programmer, Dmitry Sklyarov, was
arrested and jailed on a charge of a DMCA violation in 2001, because he was alleged
to have been involved in creating a software program that allows circumventing some
restrictions on Adobe electronic books.75
These restrictions generally have an impact on competition and innovation, as has
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Chamberlain, 381 F. 3d at 1192.
See, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years Under the DMCA, 4
(2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf (last visited April 25, 2006).
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already been pointed out.76
3.3.4

Risk of Abuse by Right Owners and the State

The fundamental difference between anti-circumvention regulations, especially
anti-device regulations and the traditional copyright law, is that anti-device regulations
outlaw the technologies themselves rather than a particular use of the technologies.77
Carter Laren describes his fear of the abuse of such regulations:
One of the things that bothers me about this idea of legislation designed
to outlaw technology is: it’s a principle that is more widely applicable
than to just [stop piracy]. You can start applying it to anything that you
think is immoral or wrong….78
Laren elaborates his fear, which is based on the danger of misusing a broad regulation.
I heard a lecture from an FBI cyber squad a couple of years ago.… [H]e
made this argument that they needed laws that outlaw these various
pieces of technology, because the more they could nail someone on, the
more violations they could get, which is better. ... The populace should
trust the FBI to not misuse those… Don’t worry, just make it illegal and
we would only go after the people that really deserve to have this
happen to them.
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Well, great, but there’s no guarantee that they are going after only bad
people, and the government has a history of expanding their powers and
doing bad things for years… So, from a philosophic standpoint, I really
dislike legislation that tries to limit technology in various ways.79
As Laren points out, the police power of the government is in question of abusing the
statute in criminal cases. In civil cases, it is a private party that could abuse the
regulations. There are already a couple of lawsuits based on the DMCA that can be
seen as an issue of fair competition rather than of protecting copyrighted materials in
the U.S.80 It is not surprising that right-holders try to exercise their rights to have a
better position in the market. In the future, even an antitrust guideline might be
necessary for exercising rights regarding anti-circumvention regulations, as it is now
regarding patents and other intellectual property law.81
3.4

Revisiting the Rationale Behind Anti-circumvention Regulations
Given the pros and cons described above, it is useful to ask whether any part of the

anti-circumvention regulations should be re-examined, especially when its cons
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overweighs its pros. Although the concrete legal proposal of how the
anti-circumvention regulations can be revised is discussed in Section 5 below, it is
helpful to revisit the rationale behind the regulations here to see that legal protection
over DRM technologies may not be the ultimate solution for stopping piracy and
sustaining content business in the digital and network environment.
3.4.1

Business Can Be Made with Broken DRM Technologies

If prohibiting circumvention of DRM technologies is for the purpose of enabling
content transaction, a question can be posed about its necessity, given the fact that
even a broken technological protection measure can successfully enable a content
business model.
This point is clearly shown by the example of DVD. Content Scramble System
(“CSS”), a software mechanism that tries to stop illegal access and reproduction of
content in DVD discs, was broken and made possible to circumvent using the software
called DeCSS. Regardless of several lawsuits,82 DeCSS is still widely available over
the Internet.83 Still, the DVD business is a profitable business for motion picture
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industries and sales have continued to grow every year in both the U.S. and Japan.84
This example suggests that, having complete security may not be as necessary to
sustain businesses as it is often claimed, even in the age of digital and network
technologies. Also, the necessity of giving legal protection is not inevitable to sustain
content business. It is rather a policy question of which is better for a society as a
whole by comparing its marginal deterrence added by anti-circumvention regulations
(note that right-holders already have traditional copyright to punish piracy as a result
of circumvention) and their negative impact on societies.85
3.4.2

Outlawing Circumvention of DRM Technologies Does Not Practically Stop
Piracy

It is very ironic that the anti-circumvention regulations, which try to ensure that
content is securely protected by DRM technologies, are strongly criticized by security
experts. Carter Laren,86 Senior Security Architect at Cryptography Research,87 claims
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that anti-circumvention does not help solve the security side of the technological
problem, especially in the long run. He understands that the basic idea behind the
anti-circumvention regulations is to make the transaction fair. As Jeffery Lawrence at
Intel says, “if there is naked content next to protected content, no one is going to buy
the protected content.”88 Still, Laren believes that such legislation cannot practically
stop those who want to hack technologies. As Laren says:
You cannot [stop them]. You can make [circumvention] software
available by download from anywhere in the world, [and] there’re
jurisdictional issues…. Even though DeCSS is totally illegal, someone
has a server that’s in the Bahamas that has DeCSS and you can
download it. If they try and put filters on it, [in order] to filter and see
you’re getting DeCSS, they will encrypt it and give you a key. And
you’ll download it and decrypt it.… There’s always a way to get around
this kind of stuff. 89
Therefore, according to Laren, prohibiting circumvention of technological protection
measures by law does not solve the problem in a substantial way. Of course, it is true
in charge of building high definition optical disks, and is heavily involved with efforts to make them
secure.
87
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in every case that having an enforceable law does not completely stop illegal actions. It
is also true that outlawing some action may serve as a deterrent to some extent.
However, given the impracticality to stop circumvention, Laren points out that the
effect of outlawing circumvention does more harm than good, as it chills the
“good-minded hackers”, i.e., security researchers who find security holes earlier than
bad-minded hackers, who often do not care about the risks of breaking the law.90
3.4.3

DRM Technologies Are Not the Final Solution to the Piracy Problem

In addition, anti-circumvention regulations that legally protect DRM technologies
also may not be as efficient for reducing mass-scale piracy as people expect, because
DRM technologies are not the final solution to the problem of piracy.
The problem of piracy fundamentally exists in the evil minds of those who steal
content, not in the incompleteness of technological security. However secure the DRM
technologies are, they can be broken if one spends enough time and money. And even
more importantly, the protected content should be able to be played and exploited by
“customers” who purchased the content, and such “customers” can be the largest
security hole in a distribution chain.
Carter Laren discusses this point in detail. First, he says that DRM technologies
90
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cannot cure the piracy problem.
The interesting thing is that, a lot of people that are not cryptographers,
that are not security experts, have this idea that cryptography is really
good for fixing their problems [of piracy].91
As Laren elaborates, he first explains the primary purpose of security technologies.
[Given my background of serving as a security expert in the U.S.
military,] let me explain why cryptography is not really enough to solve
the problem here. Cryptography is designed for a very different
problem: and that problem primarily is one of secure communications.
If I’m a trusted party and you are a trusted party, we both trust each
other, we know each other. Let’s say we are both generals in the military.
And we want to speak some secrets to each other, but we don’t want a
third party to eavesdrop or change our conversation. Cryptography is
great at solving that problem.… We can see that the data is encrypted,
and there are a lot of great security statements that you can make about
the fact that if someone is listening in the middle, they can’t change
anything or eavesdrop. So, in military systems, cryptography is very
important.92
However, as Laren says, the piracy problem is different from the secure
communication problem. He elaborates:
If you look at the problem of piracy, it’s not a secure communications
problem at all. Piracy is a totally different problem, which is: I own
some content, I trust you, and I want to let you see the content, so I am
going to give it to you. But then after I trust you, you change your mind
and become a traitor, and you share the content with someone else…. I
can very easily send you content in a way that no one in between can
get the content. But once you have it, cryptography doesn’t really help
me control it in any way. And that’s really the problem with piracy. As a
91
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result, piracy becomes a lot messier to deal with, because it starts to turn
into an engineering problem with practical limits, and you start to try to
minimize [the risk] instead of get rid of it.93
In sum, Carter emphasizes that the core of the “piracy” problem is essentially in the
evil intention of people who first get the content as “customers,” and not the security
of content delivery. It is very hard, especially in the mass content market, to
distinguish good-minded customers who use the content as they are expected to, and
ill-intentioned “customers” who then turn into pirates. And this characteristic can be
applied not only to the cryptographic component of DRM technologies, but to other
parts such as REL and watermarks.
Given this fact, the role of DRM technologies, from a security point of view, is to
increase the cost of piracy by making it difficult and costly rather than completely
eliminate it. More secure DRM technologies make it harder for pirates with
commercial intentions to build business on them, and at the same time, make it almost
impossible for technologically non-savvy people to take out the content. If so, a
solution to the problem of piracy that is effectively using DRM technologies, can be
approached not from a legal viewpoint, but rather from the viewpoint of market and
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technologies (or architecture),94 which is described in the next Section.
3.4.4

Problem of Piracy Can Be Solved Through Market and Technologies

There is an approach other than legislation to solving the problem of piracy: using
technology and the market. As it takes time and money to break technologies, the more
secure the distribution infrastructure is, or, more precisely, the more costly it is to steal
content, the less likely piracy will occur. If circumventing technologies costs more
than the benefit derived from such circumvention, commercial hackers will not try to
circumvent the technologies. Also, in the case of non-commercial hackers who take
delight in the act of hacking itself, if the damage is small enough to sustain the
business model, it could be handled as a manageable risk by the industries.
Damage from piracy, from a business perspective, can be measured by the
probability of circumventing the DRM technologies multiplied by the loss caused by
such circumvention. Carter Laren explains:
I am going to use an example of credit cards here, because fraud is
similar to [piracy]. Anyone can just decide to be you, or they can steal
your credit card and commit fraud pretty easily. The way Visa and
Mastercard, for example, look at their risk is, they really view it in
terms of the probability of attack times consequences of the attack. They
know that the probability is sort of high, and they have to mitigate the
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consequences, and they can try to reduce both parts of the equation if
they want. But in order to do this, they really set up an infrastructure
that allows them to do two major things: one is to detect when there are
problems, and the other one is to respond to problems when they
occur.95
Then, Laren describes one possible business approach as an example, which tries to
minimize both the damage of circumvention and the incentive to circumvent DRM
technologies. First, Laren explains the mechanisms of commercial pirates.
In our work with Pay TV companies, if you look at the people who are
actually pirates (… I mean, people who are actually developing the
attacks and selling them to consumers), those are generally organized
crime…. They are usually willing to invest a large amount of
non-recurring engineering costs to develop an attack, if they know that
they can then use this attack again and again.
So, in the pay TV space, for example, an organization will spend half a
million to a million dollars to take a smart card, … [and the card would
be] reverse engineered, and imaged. This is an expensive process, [but]
they hire engineers to figure out exactly what it is doing, [and] reverse
engineer all the code. They spend all this time and all this money,
because, at the end of the day, they can produce a little box for $300 that
they can sell over the Internet, that everyone would want, and … they
make their money back pretty quickly. It’s a business to them.96
Then, Laren suggests a possible solution through market mechanisms.
One of the reasons that pirates can be successful is because they don’t
have any recurring cost. A lot of these systems have got something like
all these rules built into a smart card or built into a player…. Once [the
pirates] attack them, all the content is subject to those rules, and that
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attack works for everything.
If you sort of turn this on its head and you require, instead of the player
being smart, the content has to be smart. Now, you can invest all this
energy in this piece of content, but you cannot leverage it, because [for]
the next piece of content, you have to reinvest all your energy [to break
new technologies]. It means that your game with pirates is now a little
more equitable. It means, instead of them being able to do this one shot
deal and you are done, they have to keep investing, which is always
good [for content owners]. You are not going to stop piracy, but it’s
always good to make it harder for them and force them into these
different business models.97
In sum, when you change technological protection measures on a content-by-content
basis, for example, the gain from one case of circumvention is only one kind of content,
which is far smaller than it is now. It will decrease the benefit, and thus the incentive
for commercial pirates, to hack DRM technologies. It will also reduce the damage the
content owner will suffer, even in the case of hackers without commercial intention.
Nobuyuki Watanabe at NTT Docomo describes this “protection by market” from a
different aspect. As Watanabe explains, there are very few problems regarding piracy
in the content distribution services in the i-mode market, and, to a large extent, this is
because a rational person would not try to hack the content.
For persons with normal technical expertise, when they attempt to
remove [content] from their handsets, they will end up breaking the
handsets. And since [the content] is on a level of ¥300, if you ask
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whether breaking down a handset will pay, I don't think so. If the
content were several tens of thousands of yen, it might be worthwhile
obtaining the content even though the handset broke down, but … I
think buying would be more reasonable at the cost of ¥100 or ¥300.98
It may not be clear whether these kinds of approaches using market and
technologies would be better in every. However, it would have been at least worth
studying such a question before taking legal action. In this regard, Carter Laren asks
why content owners rushed to legislative means without even trying to take a “market
and architecture” approach.
I think the reason why Hollywood is pushing [legislation that prohibits
technology] more than other industries is because … they don’t know
how to solve the problem any other way…. They have this problem;
they don’t know about technology, they know about lobbying, so that’s
what they are going to do: they jump on legislation.99
As Lawrence Lessig explains, legal regulation is only one means of regulating
people’s behavior, such as copyright infringement.100 There is no reason why they
should opt for only legal means. If copyright owners want to avoid piracies caused by
circumvention of DRM technologies, they can also seek other means than law, i.e.,
technologies and the market. Whether adding legal protection is good for the society
and thus justified should be answered by comparing the pros and cons of the specific
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regulations, which is outside the scope of this research. However, it is useful to
recognize that anti-circumvention regulations are not the only means to “fight with
piracy.”
4.

Problem of Overriding Freedom (1): Can Market Solve the Problem?
If not all, some of the override of freedom caused by DRM technologies and

anti-circumvention regulations can be solved if the implementation of DRM
technologies are well balanced.101 This Section explores whether the market can cure
the problem of too strict implementation of DRM technologies.
After presenting this question (4.1), this article describes the differences in legal
standing between right owners and the users of copyrighted works as one of the
background factors in the market negotiation regarding DRM implementation (4.2).
Then, this article describes the actual market mechanisms of development and
implementation of DRM technologies (4.3). It concludes with some analysis of
whether the market really can solve the problem of strict implementation of DRM
technologies (4.4).
4.1

Problems of the Development and Implementation of DRM Technologies
As described in Section 2, the two sources of overriding freedom within the

101

See, supra Section 2.2.2.

46

copyright regime are (i) the manner of actual implementation of the DRM technologies,
and (ii) the limitations caused by the differences in nature between computers and
human beings. This research recognizes that it would be difficult in the short run to
overcome the second problem. Therefore, this research focuses on the first issue:
whether the market can fix the problem of too strict implementation of DRM
technologies that overrides the freedom incorporated within the copyright regime.102
Obviously, the rules of DRM implementation make a large difference in the market,
both for content users and right-holders. A good and well-known example is Apple’s
iTunes Music Store, launched in April 2003.103 Before the iTunes service, the rules set
by online music stores were very strict and hardly allowed copies or transfers of
content that users purchased. Sales by these online stores were very low, and the RIAA
accused peer-to-peer file-sharing software as the major reason for the low sales.104
However, after the launch of the iTunes Music Store, the recording industry is now
convinced that people are willing to pay for the music they download.105 It may be
102
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that one of the most important reasons the iTunes Music Store became so successful is
because of the relatively flexible usage rules they applied to songs purchased from
them. Users can burn unlimited number of CDs, although a particular playlist can only
be burned up to 7 times before the playlist must be changed. They can also transfer the
purchased song up to five different computers, or wirelessly stream it to another
computer or stereo.106
Still, the trend of DRM technologies is to “manage and control” the usage of
content. As Yoshisuke Kuroda, General Manager of the Planning Department, Network
Application & Solutions Division, Sony Corporation, said in 2002:
With current technological development, it will ultimately become
possible to control from delivery of contents to the user end. One could,
if one wanted, create a system which enables the content provider to
obtain information indicating how many times or from when until when
the user has played [content]. Accordingly, the technological trend is
toward [control]. The problem is rather how to show [such control] to
the user, or to what extent to allow the user [to use the content]…. Amid
these trends, technological development has become important in order
to have compatibility, from the standpoint of the user, to allow the user
to do the same things he has done up to this point.107
end of 2003, it had sold more than 25 million songs. Sales are still growing, and as of January 2005,
Apple stated that their customers were downloading 1.25 million songs per day. Total downloads hit 300
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In addition, even the DRM used in the Apple’s iTunes Music Store does not allow
derivative uses or other uses that may be allowed under fair use or other copyright
exemptions.
If one puts the popularity of the iTunes Music Store and the technological trend of
control together, a question arises: Why did DRM technologies begin to be
implemented with strict usage rules, even though it was possible to implement them in
a more flexible way? Why is it not popular in the market to implement DRM in a
manner that is flexible enough to make it popular among consumers, or to respect the
freedom allowed under copyright law?
It is true that there are varieties of choices in how to implement DRM technologies.
Chris Parkerson, DRM Evangelist at RSA Security, says that this problem may partly
be solved by the market, as it finally comes down to the problem of a good business
model.
The technology exists to do whatever consumers want, or whatever
Hollywood wants to do to protect their content. It just comes down to
best practices.… But the best practices really haven’t arrived yet.108
However, finding the “best practices” is not an easy job. In addition, “best
practices” in the market may not mean that it reflects the freedom incorporated in the
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copyright regime. Therefore, it is interesting to look into the question of why DRM
implementation tends to be favorable to right-holders. In the following, this section
tries, based on interviews, to describe several factors that contribute to strict
implementation of DRM technologies. It also tries to see whether the market can
correct the problem of overriding freedom within the copyright regime, given the
current legal regulations.
4.2

Legal Entitlement
The first issue to be pointed out is the difference in legal standing or entitlement

between copyright owners and information users. This is important to notice, as the
differences in legal standings appeared to have an impact on the power balance
between copyright owners and users in the course of negotiations in the market, as
described below.109
As is obvious, copyright owners have a legal entitlement to decide how their works
are used, as long as copyright law grants such rights. Therefore, as a natural and
logical consequence of who has the final say on deciding the implementation rules of a
particular DRM system, both right-holders and device manufacturers agree that it is
the right-holders. Howie Singer at Warner Music states that “It is the content
109
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companies that decide what the usage rules are.” 110 And so does Intel’s Jeffery
Lawrence. To the question of who decides the actual usage rules of DRM, Lawrence
answers, “It is the content provider. Because, under the copyright law, the law gives
content providers the power to decide.”111
On the other hand, the freedoms within the copyright law, such as fair use and
other statutory exemptions, have been characterized as an “affirmative defense” in the
U.S. copyright law.112 Thus, right-holders repeatedly claim that users of copyrighted
works do not have a “right” to freely use copyrighted works, even with regard to uses
that are exempted from copyright under the law.
The legal landscape regarding “freedom” within a copyright regime is not so
different in Japan. There has been some discussion about whether some of the statutory
exemptions could be regarded as “rights” or “mandatory statutes” that could invalidate
inconsistent agreement clauses, but the issue is still far from being settled. For example,
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Koizumi and Watanabe argue that the private copying statute does not grant an
affirmative right and that users cannot, therefore, justify their violation of contracts or
circumvention of DRM systems that eliminate private copying.113
There is, therefore, an imbalance of power between the interests of the
right-holders and the users, because the former are supported by legal entitlement,
while the latter are not, even for uses that are exempted by the law and thus are
legitimate.
4.3

DRM Development Process and Power that Copyright Holders and Users
Have in the Process
Taking into account the imbalance of legal entitlement above, this section

considers whether imbalanced DRM implementation could be cured through market
processes. The considered factors are (a) how much copyright law impacts the process
of DRM implementation (4.3.1), (b) de facto controlling power by right-holders
arising from the process or procedure of DRM implementation (4.3.2), (c) relatively
strict mind-set of right-holders (4.3.3), (d) tragedy of the anticommons that
113
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right-holders suffer (4.3.4), and (e) relatively weak voices and power of users of
copyrighted works in the market (4.3.5).
4.3.1

Impact of Law in the Process of DRM Implementation

The first question in focus is this: to what extent is the copyright law, especially the
freedom within the copyright regime, considered and respected in the course of
implementation? This question is important, because if the technologist who designs
and implements DRM technologies does not pay attention to the balance within the
copyright law, it is impossible for DRM technologies to embody the balance that
copyright law incorporates.
It is interesting to learn that law is not always the guideline that gives the final
answer in the process. For example, answering the question of who determines how
many copies of content are allowed in DRM-controlled devices, Noboru Tohyama, of
the Legal Planning Department at Fujitsu, explained:
The engineers determine the actual specifications. I don't think legal
affairs is involved all that much. For example, it was the technical
people who determined a DVD format. Legal affairs become involved
in the case of contracts, but it is the technical people who determine
things such as how many times check-out [of content] can be
performed.114
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In addition, many of the technical people who are deciding the actual conditions or
usage terms of DRM technologies are not fully aware of copyright regulations, or,
more precisely, the freedom incorporated within copyright law. Therefore, it is not
surprising to find out that the consequences of the decisions made by such technical
groups often do not reflect the “freedom” of users set forth in the copyright law.
Of course, a few technologists are familiar with legal issues. Yoshisuke Kuroda at
Sony says that he pays attention to copyright law all the time.
Naturally, every country has its own laws, which must be obeyed
absolutely. Areas not determined under the law … are determined by
discussions with the content provider, and we introduce [new devices]
in each country after such discussions.115
As his background, Kuroda represented Sony several times in standard-setting
discussions such as SDMI. Given his background, paying attention to legal regulations
is nothing surprising, even as a technologist.
However, having even a great deal of legal knowledge does not always guarantee a
well-balanced DRM implementation. Specifically, device manufacturers and service
providers who have sufficient legal knowledge are often very sensitive to issues related
to their liabilities (including contributory and vicarious liability of users’ copyright
infringement). For example, given the recent trend of increasing protection over
115
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copyright holders in the U.S. courts, Masaya Otsuka, Senior Patent Manager of Sony
Corporation’s Planning & Control Department, said that even Sony no longer relied on
the Sony rulings regarding private copying.
Within Sony, there is awareness that businesses that rely on statutes on
private copying and Fair Use are now in danger. In the digital age, I
don't believe the ruling in the Sony case will remain as it is for long.
Accordingly, I believe that businesses that rely too much on statutes
allowing private copying are in danger.116
In sum, the insufficient legal knowledge of the people who actually decide the
usage rules of DRM systems, and some chilling effect on those who are aware of the
legal issues, results in a situation where freedom within copyright law may not be paid
as much attention in the course of DRM implementation as legal scholars wish.
4.3.2
4.3.2.1

Process and Procedure of DRM Development and Implementation
Traditional Process and Procedure

Several processes of technology implementation and market release of devices also
shows how much power or influence the content owners have in the market of DRM
technologies. Although the following are only a few examples, it can be said that
content owners clearly have had some influence over device designs.
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Yoshisuke Kuroda at Sony explains the custom of seeking consensus from the
content owner about new devices that are released into the market. He made clear that
before the release of products, the company brings the devices to industries that would
have some interest in their release, and explains and negotiates laying the groundwork
for the release.
Such negotiations before product releases would certainly have some impact on the
features device makers could add to their products. The amount of influence is not the
same, however, in the PC and consumer electronics (CE) markets. In general, the CE
industry is more influenced by this consensus-seeking process than the PC industry is.
For example, regarding VAIO, personal computers designed by Sony, Kuroda
admits that they always bring new VAIOs and explain the features to major
right-holders. However, Kuroda says they do not always listen to what right-holders
say.
I think VAIOs are taking relatively various “adventurous” features. If
you ask content holders, sometimes they say no, but there are times we
just go ahead and release them.
On the PC side, if we don’t offer something that other companies do
offer, then from the users’ standpoint, a function is “lacking”, in which
case the product won’t sell. For example, there was much debate inside
Sony when we decided to add a CD-R burning function to VAIO, [but
we decided to do so because we had to] in order to stay competitive in
56

the market.117
Kuroda explains that such independence from content owners applies only to PCs,
not to the CE or home electronics industries. The difference, Kuroda says, comes from
the structural difference of the markets the devices are put in.
The difference in culture between the PC and CE industries is a
difference of perspective. The world of home electronics is one in which
you cannot do business without content. The PC world has the
advantage that it is not really necessary to listen to music [using a PC].
Recently, it is becoming so that content is important for the PC as well.
But the difference remains between whether having content is an
absolute necessity or just “one of them.”118
Bruce Polichar, former Vice President of the Entertainment Department at IBM,
agrees with Kuroda’s point. Polichar elaborates the willingness of the CE industry to
be more accommodating to right-holders, from the viewpoint of recouping research
and development (“R&D”) costs that they have already invested. First, Polichar points
out that the risks of developing new distribution technologies are always on the side of
technology companies.
In almost every era of the entertainment business history, the
entertainment companies have demanded that the technology companies
take all of the R&D risks. The entertainment companies are always slow
to make industry-wide choices about which technologies they want to
endorse.119
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Given such R&D risks, Polichar says that CE companies have an incentive to make the
device successful in the market, which often results in accommodating right-holders.
[CE companies] want to hear from the entertainment companies about
what kind of new delivery systems could build new sales of
entertainment content. But in most cases, they have already been
working on new devices in their R&D labs by the time they start
discussions with the entertainment companies. Then they take the new
devices to the entertainment industry seeking its endorsement of the
new devices…
In other words, while the CE company is trying to achieve acceptance
of a new device, it needs the blessings of the content owners. It needs
the content owners to say they will release content on the new device.
The CE companies are often willing to give very favorable
compensation to the entertainment companies in order to get content for
the new device.120
For example, in order for DVD players to sell well in the market, the market also has
to have a variety of DVD disk titles available. Therefore, in order to convince content
owners to release the content in their format, the format has to be favorable to the
content owners.
In addition, Bruce Polichar maintains that this process matches the interests of
content holders.
The entertainment companies often fear that if they do not negotiate
licensing deals with the CE companies early in the development process
…, they will not be able to negotiate favorable deals once the device has
120
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become a standard.121
Toru Maruhashi and Noboru Tohyama at Fujitsu agree with Polichar’s point. They
explained their dilemma when they released DVD players. Answering the question of
whose convenience they consider in determining the specifications of DVD devices,
Maruhashi and Tohyama said:
(Maruhashi) It also varies according to the device. Since portable music
delivery uses a complex system such as certification authorities, one
also has to consider the side of operating the certification authorities.
With a standalone device such as a DVD player, the sale of devices has
more priority, so they pay more attention to the content holders.
(Tohyama) When DVDs were first started, we went straight to
Hollywood to ask about the format, not to the users or the sales outlets.
(Maruhashi) That's true, but actually we would like to sell devices
without going to Hollywood, if possible. Still, the idea was that, without
any content to sell, one cannot sell players either.
(Tohyama) That's why DRM does exactly what Hollywood says.122
In sum, especially in the CE industry, there is a history of seeking the consent or
blessing of the content holders, which often results in the implementation of favorable
DRM rules. In the PC industry, such influence by right-holders seems to have been
less in the past, which may be changing as described in the next Section.
4.3.2.2
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Environment
The influence of content owners over technological design seems to be growing in
the broadband era, as the presence of entertainment content such as music, motion
pictures, or books in electronic form is growing in daily lives. As these entertainments
leave the tangible packages and started to be delivered online, the influence of content
owners is expanding to many areas other than CE industry, such as PC industries and
online distribution services.
For example, Bruce Polichar says the situation described above regarding CE
companies is starting to expand to “the computer companies who are making more and
more devices that are used for entertainment.”123
Ron Bell, an attorney who supervises the licensing contracts and services at
Yahoo’s Legal Department, says the following:
Copyright policy is a mix of content-provider friendly and user friendly.
But I would put a measure of this probably more on content-provider
friendly…. Some of the advocates are way in favor of consumers, and
content providers are more on the DRM side of the defense, and Yahoo
tries to strike a balance because we do both. Probably we are now a bit
friendlier to the content providers, because we create content and we
manage content, and we have contracts and restrictions and laws that we
have to pay attention to.124
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Another example in the field of online service is Musicmatch,125 a more focused
content-distribution service online. Online content-distribution businesses in particular
have to convince content owners in order to set up their business, just as the CE
industry needs to have the blessing of the content owners. For this reason, when
obtaining licenses, online service providers tend to have less bargaining power than
right-holders, who are backed up by their legal entitlements as copyright.
First, Bob Ohlweiler, Senior Vice President of Business Development at
Musicmatch, describes the long history of their struggle in starting up their music
store:
Unfortunately, the download music business did not develop because
the license from the music labels was not good enough to build business
on. So, we had to stay [out of the distribution] business for a number of
years…. At the end of 2003, Universal [Music] primarily, started to
open up their mind toward to the download business. They started
clearing rights for digital distributions with artists, and [provided with]
reasonable licensing terms. Apple succeeded to convince several music
labels to have reasonable licenses and was a big hit. That led us to do
the download business at last,... 8 years [after starting the company].126
He then explains that, after starting the business, their heavy dependency upon
copyright influenced the usage rules of DRM technologies.
The way the DRM market works is that the DRM technology
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companies go to the content owners (music and movies) and get
approvals or permissions from content companies that their DRM offers
sufficient protection for people to use their content. If I went to
Universal Music and said I wanted to use this technology that they think
is too loose, they would say “No, you can’t. Use something with higher
standards.” This is the first thing. Content owners generally approve
what their partners use to distribute their contents. The second is that the
content companies own the usage models because that’s their product,
so they defined how their content is used.127
Toru Maruhashi at Fujitsu admits this increasing influence of content owners in the
online world. Maruhashi states that “[f]rom infrastructure providers, content holders to
content providers, there is no incentive whatsoever to consider the freedom [of the
users].”128
It is not only online distribution services where the influence of right-holders
increases. The development of devices is not independent from such growing influence.
Answering the question of whose convenience is considered in determining the
specifications of DRM technologies installed into devices, Toru Maruhashi at Fujitsu
says:
Our company wants to take various people into consideration, but when
one talks with the people who are accomplishing technological
development, they begin from the idea of having the content providers
purchase their technologies. While, in the end, they think about matters
such as ‘how many times check-out can be performed’ [from the users’
point of view]. But they first consider how to appeal to the people who
127
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deliver content to them.129
The same tendency can be observed in the DRM technology providers. As Jeffery
Lawrence at Intel says:
If you talk with DRM solution providers, they just provide the
technologies to the content providers to allow them to offer whatever
they want, because they are not in the policy call; that’s not their
business. That’s true for all the DRM stuff.
Now we are starting the high definition tools. [Many players in the
market] need content for that. That is why you probably hear more
people paying more attention to the content providers. And I don’t know
how to change that, except that you come up with a good technology
and get some bargaining power.130
4.3.3

Mindset of Right Holders

If the influence of the content owners is growing, and if they legally have the final
word for the actual usage terms implemented in the system, the question worth
studying is the mindset of content owners: i.e., how strictly content owners want the
DRM technologies to be implemented?
In the following, this research points out five characteristics of the content owners’
mindset as well as their obligations as commercial entities.
4.3.3.1

Fear of the Online World

The first to point out is the fear content holders have toward digital and network
129
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technologies. As Bruce Polichar explains, content owners have almost always been
somewhat afraid of the new technologies.
In the case of the entertainment industry, every single period of growth
in the industry has been driven by technological innovations. This has
been true for about 100 years. Think about it: the motion picture camera,
film projection, color and sound in film, television broadcasting, long
playing phonograph records, digital audio, video cassettes, etc. All have
represented growth of the entertainment economy and all are based on
new technologies at the time.
However, in every period of technological innovation, the media
companies have been suspicious and fearful of the new technologies
and the people who are offering them. They are worried that these
technology providers will own the solution and develop control over the
entertainment companies’ business by owning the technologies critical
to growth of the industry.131
Recent technological changes brought by digital and network technologies are not
exceptions: the fear of content holders toward digital network technologies was
outstanding. This fear is very well represented in the U.S. by efforts to generate new
copyright legislation, and the spate of lawsuits in the recent RIAA and MPAA
campaigns.132
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Because the dominant fear is that their content may be widely distributed in a
digital form over the network, especially peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks, the
main target of their concern is the digital output of devices. As one executive from a
major media company and motion picture studio in the U.S. describes this point:
There are some relatively simple initial licensing decisions that we can
make. If somebody came to us with a device that allows someone to
purchase a video online and download it to a device that has no outputs,
it would be relatively easy for us to get into business conversations,
because … it is clear that no copies will be made from the device.
If there is an analog output, it’s a little more difficult, because a
consumer could now copy to, say a VCR, and then to other devices that
have analog or digital outputs. But the copy would not be the highest
quality and even this is not that far outside the reasonable environment
that we have been in.
However, once a device has a digital output, we are in a different
environment because the digital output allows a perfect copy to be
made.… We are not happy if there’s a digital output without any
restriction, because once the content is out, it’s available to be recopied
without any restrictions by anyone….
Many people would agree that there are many situations in which
making one copy for personal use is reasonable, especially in situations
where you have paid for the original content. The question is where you
draw the line on additional copies or sharing of copies with other people,
and here it’s much harder to come up with a consensus.133
Records, Inc. et al. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d. 1004 (9th Cir., 2001), MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (U.S., 2005).
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In Japan, things are no different. Izumi Fukuda, General Manager of the Business
Planning Department of Tresola Corporation that was established for distributing TV
program online,134 and employed at TV Asahi, one of Japan’s major TV stations, says
that it was because of the content owners’ fears that they employed the DRM system in
a very strict manner in their test webcasts in late 2002 and early 2004.
The right-holders believe that if something appears on the Net, it will be
ripped. That is why we provided them with rock-solid security … in
order to gain their trust.... There are some companies in the Net business
who don't want to implement security because of its high cost. However,
since things have become digital, the DRM aspect has become
important, and it is a major premise that this is being implemented
properly.135
4.3.3.2

Is DRM-based Security the First Priority for Content Owners?

If content owners fear digital output, the natural consequence is to limit any digital
copying or digital transfer from the devices. It was not surprising, therefore, that,
especially in its infancy, the implementers of DRM technologies tried to avoid
flexibility such as allowing copying or transferring content.
In order to express their concerns toward digital copies, content owners repeatedly
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say, in the course of development of new devices, new business models, or new
technological standards, that security is their priority. As an executive from a major
media company and motion picture studio maintains:
One area where protection technologies haven’t been effective yet is in
the DVD space. The industry deployed security technologies when they
first set the standards, but some measures have been less than ideally
effective. But now DVD manufacturers don’t have a lot of motivation to
go back and fix that, because the margins on DVD players have become
so low (now the price is $39.99 at Best Buy). They may not want to
spend an extra ten cents per unit, figuratively, to make it more secure.
And even if they are willing to spend the money, we still have the
legacy problem of how to change the technology in a way that the next
generation doesn’t disenfranchise the installed-based hardware of
consumers.
So, now we are in this inflection point where the most efficient place we
can do something effective is in next-generation media. Because we
have to deal with the same manufacturers about high definition DVD,
we have to move the DRM piece to be near the top of the list and say,
“if we want to have even higher quality movies on this new platform,
we need to make DRM a very high priority,” although we don’t know
fully how we are going to implement it yet. The system has to have
effective ways of exercising usage rules.136
In practice, however, it is sometimes difficult to implement DRM-based protection
with complete security because of the business costs. As Izumi Fukuda at Tresola,
which invested a huge amount of money for a DRM-based player, explains his
dilemma:
136
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In order to ease the anxieties of the right-holders, we put a lot of effort
into our explanations to obtain their consent, and also put a large effort
into DRM, because it was necessary to allay their anxieties by showing
them protection.... If these had to be considered unavoidable as
necessary expenses, and if [running the business] didn’t pay under such
expenses, then it means we would have no market.137
In reality, Tresola decided to postpone their business because they found that it would
not be profitable enough, given the high expenses of distributing DRM players and
providing customer support.138
There is, however, an objection to security being the first priority when thinking of
DRM implementation. According to Gabe Zichermann, Vice President of Strategy and
Communications at Trymedia Systems, a game distribution company using
peer-to-peer network139 disagrees that the issue of security is important when pursuing
an online distribution business.
There is a common misperception about DRM. DRM is not strictly
about security. Making that mistake, and it will not work. The purpose
of DRM is for the following three things, in this order. No 1: make it as
easy as possible for consumers to buy the product in question. No 2:
give consumers fair and reasonable use rights to the product that you are
selling them. No 3: protect it. And this is the common error: that you
137
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reverse the order of these things in most DRM architectures. And what
you do is you make the consumers angry, and what they do is they make
you and the press angry….140
Trymedia acknowledges, after a survey on their customers’ behaviors on copying game
software, that there are customers who copy their products and exchange them with
friends.141 Still, Zichermann thinks that lightweight and user-friendly DRM is better
for their overall business, as explained in the next Section.
4.3.3.3

Content Owners’ Duty and Incentive to Maximize Profit

Of course, it is the content owners’ duty to their shareholders to maximize profit.
To be able to do this, right-holders often claim that they have to manage every use of
the content to make sure they get a proper monetary return from such uses. As Jeffery
Lawrence at Intel puts it:
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The result of the survey is the following.
15% of consumers admit to copying retail games in the past 6 months.
66% asserted their right to make backup copies of games.
64% said that illegal copying hurt game developers.
Each admitted copier buys an average of 7 games per year and makes 17 copies.
35 copies are made per 100 units sold on average.
The top three reasons why people make copies:
#1 Personal backup
#2 To share with friends
#3 To use them on multiple computers (such as desktop and laptop)
The top reasons consumers share games are:
#1 To play multiplayer games with their friends
#2 Their friends asked them to
#3 They thought their friends would like the game
Consumers felt that their friends were honest people and that sharing could result in their friend buying
his own copy about 50% of the time.
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One true point is that, if they could, the content providers would try to
extract as much value as they could from the consumers. So we have to
make sure that the market works, and that they are always under some
pressure to consider consumer preferences.142
Also, Bob Ohlweiler describes the reactions of recording companies when they
struggled to start their online music store. Negotiations with recording companies were
difficult even after the success of the iTunes Music Store.
Record labels originally did not want the other services to take the
Apple model. They felt that Apple model was too liberal, and for one
dollar the consumers should not be allowed to make copies for the
entire life…. I spent my entire summer in New York to negotiate with
the music labels. We ended up with pretty liberal rules.143
However, there are some disagreements as to how much control is “better to
maximize their profits.” Gabe Zichermann says:
I think the recording industry and the motion picture industry need to
step back and say, do I want to antagonize my customers, or do I want
to sell products to my customers. Answer that first question. So, start by
saying I want to sell products to my customers.
Two, say “do I believe that my customers have the right to use content
in certain ways?” which is another important area.144
Then Zichermann describes responses of right-holders at a game developers’
conference.
[E]very single one that you talked to [at the game conference], and you
say, “you know, consumers should be able to make back-up copies of
142
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the games, right?” and they go “Absolutely.” “Consumers should be
able to share copies with their friends and that results in revenues to you,
right?” “Absolutely.”145
As a proof, Zichermann explains that his game distribution business uses P2P
technologies and has many customers who make some copies but is still making a
profit.
So last week,146 we announced the first coherent unified solution of
digital rights on games and software that allows game and software
publishers to protect the content with the same technique on discs and
downloads. Consumers may now back up their game and software
content that they buy on CD media, they may make copies, copies that
are made on trial mode and may be passed along, with full track
ability.… The reaction was phenomenal. Everybody in the game
business gets it….147
Therefore, according to Zichermann, the obligation to shareholders to run the business
profitably does not necessarily mean having DRM technologies implemented in a very
strict manner.
In sum, the flexibility of usage rules in the course of DRM implementation seems
to depend upon, at least to some extent, the right-holders’ recognition of what the
“profitable” business models are, of consumer acceptance and satisfaction, or
acknowledgements of users’ freedom or “rights” in using their works.
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4.3.3.4

Licenses Are Difficult to Revise

The preference for strict DRM implementation by right-holders appears not only
when one tries to start a new business model. It also impacts when service providers
try to change business models in favor of users. For example, this kind of struggle can
be found in the case of i-mode mobile content distribution business by NTT Docomo.
Nobuyuki Watanabe, a technology expert at NTT Docomo responsible for deciding
the technological specifications of mobile handsets for the i-mode business, says that
negotiations with content owners was relatively easy when they first started the i-mode
business.
In the i-mode service, [every content] is from ¥100 to ¥300 per month.
With mobile handsets, a system has been launched so that downloaded
content as a general rule cannot be sent out. [Such a system] made it
possible to negotiate [to have content licensed] at extremely low
royalties.148
Watanabe then explains that this rule of “no copy allowed” restricts the technology
design of the newer handsets.
With camera phones, … since the copyright for photographs taken by
the user basically belongs to the user himself, an external memory is
provided. However, the form is such that downloaded content
(including content forwarded from friends) cannot be stored into the
external memory. Only photographs taken by the user himself can be
stored in it. Also with the infrared communications of 504, the system is
148
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designed so that all content downloaded from the Net can’t be stored [in
the external memory]….The basic elements of these standards are from
the i-mode Business Division, and were determined so as to satisfy the
needs of protecting content providers.149
After describing the current system, Watanabe expresses the difficulty of revising their
license terms with content owners, once agreements are made. This is not unique to
copyright licenses. However, this difficulty is becoming a large concern for NTT
Docomo, as the size of downloadable content becomes larger. Watanabe elaborates:
Currently, when switching to a new mobile handset for reasons such as
breakage or a model change, telephone listings can be transferred, but
Java game applications or other copyrighted content cannot be
transferred [to the new handset]. The basic position is to have the buyer
repurchase [the content]. However, there has been a desire to be able to
move [the content], since the content [size] is large, and the call charges
[for downloading] would be by no means negligible. In particular, there
has been a strong request from service departments which handle
customer needs.150
However, the request has not been accepted because of the reluctance to change the
terms of content licenses.
The i-mode Business Division is somewhat backward looking, because
they believe that the basis of the business is for the content provider to
have peace of mind.… The difficult thing is that allowing content to be
transferred has no merit as far as content providers are concerned. They
can see the risk aspect and therefore can't give their consent. From the
technical aspect, it may be possible to transfer [content] to an external
memory or PC somewhat securely by providing encryption and
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decryption keys, but the content providers have not given their OK.151
Without a legal requirement or some other incentive to convince content owners to
think otherwise, it may be difficult to persuade them to alter their favorable license
terms in order to accommodate the user freedoms recognized in copyright law.
4.3.3.5

Desire, Need, or Right to Protect the “Brand” of Works

Another aspect of right-holders’ reluctance to employ “freedom-friendly” DRM
implementation is their desire to protect the “brand image” or their copyrighted works,
especially when they are well-known or established. In answer to the question of why
they are not willing to let users modify their works as a part of fair use, an executive
from a major media company and motion picture studio explained:
[T]he most fundamental problem of consumer editing is that, they may
republish and sell our content or offer it in damaging ways. We actually
license the products to consumers from which they can copy and print
our characters on invitation cards. But it would be very damaging for us
if somebody creates a version containing pornography. I don’t think the
law requires that people should be allowed to do such things.152
This question of maintaining the “brand image” of copyrighted works becomes
crucial, especially with regard to cartoon characters or other copyrighted works that
can also serve as trademarks. For example, Disney has registered Mickey Mouse and
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other cartoon characters as trademarks, both in the U.S. and Japan.153 Although the
question of protection in the intertwining area of copyright and trademark (or unfair
competition) is beyond the scope of this research, it is worthwhile mentioning, as a
reality of the market, that right-holders’ desire or need to protect copyrighted works
under trademark law (especially after the copyright has expired) is another large factor
preventing flexible DRM implementation.
This issue becomes more problematic in Japan, as the desire to keep the “brand
image” of their works is legally protected as one of the moral rights.154 In Japan,
copyright holders and performers have a “right to maintain the integrity of the
work.”155 A great deal of attention has recently been called to this problem in Japan,
and the government has started a working group to study a possible reduction in the
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scope of moral rights.156
4.3.4

The Problem of the Anticommons that Right Holders Face

One of the reasons DRM technologies tend to have restricted usage rules that
override the freedom within the copyright regime surely has to be the mindset of
right-holders. And one of the ironies here is that, in some cases, right-holders
themselves suffer from the tragedy of the anticommons, or the underuse of copyrighted
information because of the multiple right-holders in a piece of content157 regarding the
copyrighted works that they have rights to.
Music and motion pictures in particular have many right-holders involved in one
piece of content. Works of music have right-holders to melodies, lyrics, performance,
and sound recordings. Motion picture right-holders include the authors of the original
story and screenplay, directors, performers, other art designers, the people involved in
the music included in the film. Therefore, right-holders such as record labels and
156
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motion picture studios often are unable to offer flexible licensing terms because they
do not hold all the rights.
For example, an executive from a major media company and motion picture studio
says:
There are other rights holders in our movies, and we don’t have a right
to say that consumers can take out music that we have been licensed
from someone else … and include them in other works, for example.158
4.3.5

Voice and Power of Users of Copyrighted Works

In order for the market to solve the problem of DRM implementation too often
favoring right-holders, the users of copyrighted works have to have some voice and
power in the market to reflect their needs. This section analyzes what mechanisms
exist for users to reflect their voice, and how powerful their voice can be.
4.3.5.1

Users Can Speak Through Money, but Not Efficiently

Of course, the simplest answer is that users can express themselves as consumers
in the market. Intel’s Jeffery Lawrence explains:
At the end of the day, the market decides (the right balance between
copyright holders and users)…. People won’t buy stuff they don’t
like….159
Bruce Polichar agrees that users speak for themselves.
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The customer speaks with only one voice: MONEY! When the
customer sees something it likes, it says so by spending money to get it.
That is the only message the CE or PC or new services industries can
rely on. Very few people will guess correctly what the right offering is
before they try it.... Customers don't ask anyone to look out for them.
They just ask to be entertained. Whoever entertains them gets their
money.160
It is true that ultimately users speak as consumers in the market. For example, this
has been somewhat true in the world of digital music distribution. The development of
more flexible usage terms were pushed by consumer rejection of earlier and stricter
usage rules, as well as by their clear preference for the flexibility manifested in P2P
file-sharing networks.
Jeffery Lawrence points out:
In the case of music, content providers realize that you have to give a lot
of flexibility to make them reach out for their content. People will steal
it if you cannot make copies. They are learning in a hard way. The
negotiations with the music companies have been very hard for us,
because they want to hold back and have complete restraint. The truth is,
it is not acceptable in the market place. And if you are a device
manufacturer, you don’t want to invest a lot of money on technologies
that you know consumers would reject. And so we have to negotiate
with the content community to find a middle ground.161
Kevin Saul, Director of Trademark, Copyright, & Corporation Marketing at the
Legal Department of Apple Computer, Inc., pictures the episode of developing the
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iTunes Music Store as follows:
There was not a true popular music store before us. Some of the
services were very restrictive. In practice, music companies are losing
single sales and also CD sales year over year, and all of what I call
“futile” attempts by the music business to protect their CDs are
essentially competing with free. We wanted to provide a legitimate
alternative. Apple is known for its user friendliness…. We spent a lot of
time thinking about how we can navigate the center....
So we went into negotiations with major labels. We have to keep honest
people honest. There are so many hackers out there, and our thought
was that if we took the position of trying to absolutely prevent hacking
of any usage rules or DRM, it would significantly impact the customers’
acceptance of the music store, and they would flock to the free
services.162
The result of Apple’s “experiment” was a great hit. It could be argued that such
“success” was partly led by market mechanisms, especially by users sending signals
that they did not like the old services with strict rules and that they preferred much
more flexible usage terms.
Chris Parkerson, DRM Evangelist at RSA Security, which provides DRM
technologies to game consoles as part of their business, also recognizes the point:
Ultimately, no one is going to sell anything if there are not providing
services that consumers want, and they aren’t [now]…. There is always
going to be a need, of course, for Hollywood and whomever to make
sure that they are going to get paid and they are going to get their
revenues, but nothing is ever going to be restrictive to the point that it
162
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starts interfering with what consumers want, because what we will end
up having is that consumers just won’t buy it.
So, the weight is always going to hold with the consumers. I think we
are still in very early stages; we’re really just trying to figure out exactly
what it looks like.163
However, the voice of consumers through money is not perfect, either. Although
the purchasing practices of users in the market surely affect the direction of DRM
developments, it sometimes takes a long time, a great deal of investments, and, in
some cases, even illegal damage to both parties before the market reaches a better
balance. This is because, in the market, users only have a choice “to buy or not to
buy.” Money of users is not sufficient because it does not tell the content owners,
service providers, or device makers what else users want or how they want the devices
and services to be changed.
4.3.5.2

Users Speak Through Technology Companies

Therefore, to avoid unnecessary cost and pain, it would be better for both the users
and suppliers of the market to have some mechanisms to represent the concrete needs
of users in the course of DRM development and implementation.
Michael Miron, CEO of ContentGuard, maintains that it would be “nice, and
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maybe even desirable,”164 to have consumers represented in the venues of DRM
development and implementation, although not necessary because “[t]hey vote with
their wallets and with their feet.”165
It is easy to imagine that such a reflection of users’ voices is more difficult than
suppliers’ voices because of the transaction cost. It is usually costly, and thus more
difficult, to summarize the voices of users as a class in the market, which is already
known in many fields such as product liability cases or environmental pollution or
other nuisance cases, just to mention a few. In these cases, one approach to solving the
problem is to use an agent. It is helpful to have an agent that understands the desire of
the class properly and acts accordingly.
In the history of copyright regulation, it is often believed or hoped that the
technology industries, such as the PC industry, the CE industry, and the technology
providers, act as one of the agents of the users.166 Is this mechanism still valid under
the issue of DRM implementation?
Technology industries have a strong incentive to know users’ preferences through
164
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their response to products in the market. Some key players in the technology industry
describe their attempts to reflect the preferences of users in the market. Jeffery
Lawrence at Intel describes users’ needs and desires:
People always want to make recordings. And from our perspective,
content protection and DRM is not about limiting copying. In fact, the
DRM should be all about enabling copying and enabling consumer use.
The truth is: the thing that makes people buy products or consume
contents is the ability to do things with the contents. They like to make
copies. That is what they want. So what DRM should do is to create a
protected environment [to do so]. You cannot put it onto the Internet to
give it away to the world, but you can do things you want in your own
personal environment. From our perspective, if I make a hundred
million copies but all protected so that other people cannot use them,
who would care? Why do content providers have to care about the fact
that I move the contents to this device and that device as long as it is not
put onto the Internet to be given away? In fact, they should like that,
because that would make people buy more content….
In your home environment, [people expect that] you have substantial
flexibility. Unless that actually happens, and consumers can do what
they want to do, no DRM in the world would ever be effective, because
consumers would reject it. If the consumers reject it, they will opt out
for the illegitimate alternatives.167
Bob Ohlweiler at Musicmatch describes the preferences of music listeners as follows:
We know a lot about our consumers. Generally what they want is a
library on multiple PCs, and many CDs without worrying about dipping
into some quota for burning. And music labels want some limits on that.
So Apple came up with this idea of “playlist.”
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[We understand their preferences] through focus groups, customer
services, and speaking with customers, and talking with people inside
the companies who are also the consumers of our product.168
Given their understanding of customer preferences, technology companies and
service providers convey the preferences to some extent in negotiations with content
owners. Yoshisuke Kuroda at Sony explains:
Speaking of management of content by DRM, there are some points
without which you will not have a marketable product. For such points,
we propose them to the content side. We communicate with them,
telling them that, if that doesn't happen, ultimately, DRM itself will not
work and products won't sell. When the rules of DRM are specifically
determined, the device manufacturers will basically state their opinions
from the users’ side. Then, finally, decisions will be made based on
negotiations with the content holders.169
Of course, this is not an easy process, especially in the DRM implementation. Kuroda
describes the difficulties he faces:
The position from the content side desiring to protect security is
completely at odds with usability. We are stuck between the two sides
and must make the adjustments. That is the hardest part.170
Jeffery Lawrence admits that the influence of the copyright owners is growing in
the area of DRM and that device manufacturers have more bargaining power than
service providers do when negotiating with copyright holders.
[H]ere is the dynamic of [how we keep the balance in DRM systems].
We need content and to make it friendly for our customers. Content
168
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owners need content protection. Nobody wants to pay for content
protection, but we need that to support a legitimate business model. And
none of us want the government to come in and arbitrate what the rules
should be.…
DRM solution companies and other Internet content service providers
have to get content straight from the content providers. They don’t have
leverage over content providers at all. They have to do whatever content
providers want. In fact, that is the great beauty of DRM, because that
would give content providers great flexibility, whether to offer to see it
once, twice, or for a day. The only problem is, the DRM cannot reach
everywhere in the home. DRM is only one piece of the technology. It
has to have clients anywhere, otherwise it cannot go there.
Then there is other group of people who build devices. And device
manufacturers have some leverage over content providers, because they
have a variety of ways to get content. They can get content from TV,
packages, the Internet; they can even have illegal [and unprotected]
content. So, they are less dependent. And content providers need
devices to see the content, and they need protection there. So, there is a
room for content providers [to make compromises].171
However, Lawrence also makes clear that there are limits in what they can get from
negotiations with content owners.
We are trying to make sure we are engaged in the discussion, and the
only leverage you have is to bring your technologies and find solutions
to their problem that are reasonable. It’s a negotiation to get the
minimum [of freedom].
That’s how we set the floor, i.e., set the minimum standards. That is the
best we can do. We don’t have more leverage with the content providers.
And we see what they offer. We cannot make them offer different
171
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products….172
Lawrence also makes clear that the fair use doctrine or other statutory exemptions are
not necessarily the guiding principle of negotiations when they try to get flexibility in
DRM implementation.
Fair use is great, but it is really a narrow exception. In practice, as a
product maker, I am not interested in fair use. I want more than fair use.
I don’t think people would buy a DVD to snip a small piece of the DVD
and write a book report. That is not why people buy devices. I want
more. That is where the technology community will get together and
negotiate with the content community to have a deal. That should be
done through business deals. The content community is coming to
understand that they have to meet consumer expectations.173
Lawrence says that in areas with established customs, it is easier to negotiate.
The only place we have public policy is the area that people are used to
already. Cable TV and packaged media, these have been out there for
some time now, and people have expectations of devices and media, [so
DRM should meet these expectations].174
Lawrence uses an example of usage rules in Digital Transmission Content Protection
(DTCP), which is a cryptographic protocol to protect audio/video content while
allowing the content to travel over the Internet.175
In terms of DTCP, the primary use is to help you distribute TV and
cable content. But the condition there is that, if the content is free cable
TV, people can make as many copies as they want. If it is premium
172
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cable, like HBO, people can still make copies, maybe not millions of
them, but still can in archive as well. The only area that you cannot copy
is the PPV. This was the deal made with content communities. Content
providers gave up these rights to have protection technologies for
them.176
However, such a “policy call” does not exist where people try to establish a new
business model. Lawrence maintains,
But there are many new areas, and that’s where the all real business is
going to be. Who decides the rules there? I don’t think that’s the role of
the government. It is basically the role of content providers. But we can
negotiate with them because they need us.177
For such new areas of business, there is no other means but to negotiate using
repeated trial and error in order to reach a comfortable solution. This process needs
much more effort than is usually claimed in order to get a well-balanced DRM
implementation. It is not an easy process, as every industry has its own goals and
interests. As Bruce Polichar states,
In some ways it is unavoidable that each industry pursues its own
business. There is more dialog between these industries than there used
to be. But it will never be a real partnership where they all collaborate to
build new markets. Each part of the triangle still wants to maximize its
own position.178
However, people always learn lessons, and things are still getting better. As Chris
Parkerson states,
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It is getting better.… I think [the success of iTunes] was really what has
got a change, and the content owners are starting to get a little bit more
engaged.… [but] the fact that they have been taking a more active role
… in defining “what do you need to facilitate your business” has been
rather a set back. I think it’s because there’s still an animosity on the
content owners’ side toward new technologies, toward technology
companies. I think they are getting better. [However,] I think we would
be in a slightly different world right now, if content owners had been a
lot more active in defining the rules of these digital contents.179
In sum, in order to reflect users’ voices in the early stages of service and device
design, technology companies make some efforts in negotiations with content holders.
However, both the understanding and power of technology companies are sometimes
rather limited to reflect the sincere voices of the users in the course of DRM
implementation. Therefore, in new services or business models where customs are not
yet established, technology companies can gain only the “minimum” freedom when
copyright owners are unwilling to give it, given the difference in legal standings. Many
efforts are made in the market, but it is still a very slow move. Also, it is questionable
whether DRM implementation completely reflects the freedom implemented in the
traditional copyright regime, as players in the market do not fully respect the rules in
the law as their guiding principles.
4.4
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Given the description of the players in the market above, it is now useful to ask this
question: Can the market really solve the problem of strict DRM implementations
overriding the freedom within the copyright regime? Or, more precisely, can the
market bring DRM implementations that fully respect the freedom within the
copyright regime?
As described above, some of the freedom is actually implemented given the
pressure of the market. Online music stores now respect freedom or “users’ rights,”
such as the freedom to make backup copies or freedom to give the content to a limited
number of friends. It took several years and significant suffering in the music industry
before they reached the current business model.180 Still, many people attribute this
“success” to the market.
However, not every problem can be solved in this way, especially for issues which
a limited number of people are involved in. For example, making backup copies is
important, but it is still only one form of fair use or statutory exemption. There are
many other exemptions to be taken care of. Even the iTunes Music Store does not
allow exempted uses which include modification of works such as quotations. This
may be because (1) the need to make quotations or re-mixing is much smaller or far
180
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less recognized by the market than the need to make backup copies; (2) some content
owners have negative feelings toward modification, and in Japan, there is a moral right
to maintain the integrity of works; (3) it is technologically much more challenging to
protect the content while allowing modification compared to allowing simple copying;
and (4) the value of such utilization of copyrighted works is a positive externality and
thus will not be fully considered by the market.181 Given these factors, it can be said
that it is much more difficult for the market to make DRM implementation include
exemptions with modifications.
Another difficulty in solving the problem through the market is caused by the
highly technological aspect of DRM technologies. Content owners, who have the final
word in deciding the use of content (which in many cases determines the design of
services and devices), are still slow in fully understanding the technologies. Therefore,
they may not completely understand the limitations of DRM technologies, or may not
understand the best use of them. The highly technological aspect also makes it difficult
for end-users of content to feed back their voices into the market, as they may not fully
understand what technologies are doing in their devices, and they may not be able to
181
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provide sufficient proposals to solve the problems they encounter.
In addition, as has been repeatedly pointed out, differences in legal standings
between right-holders and content users182 creates a difference of bargaining power in
the negotiations, and makes the content rules heavily dependent on right-holders.
Under such circumstances, it is very hard to implement fair use and other copyright
exemptions.
Therefore, it seems that some part of the override problem may not be able to be
solved through the market, at least in the short run. In some areas, the market process
is in a vicious circle: DRM implementation is very strict; which causes less consumer
acceptance in the market and more illegal conduct by consumers; which creates the
fear and defensive attitude of content holders; which may lead to a stronger desire for
stricter usage rules of content. In order to improve the situation, Section 5 below
explores some choices of what law can do to keep a better balance of interest between
copyright owners and users in DRM implementations.
5.

The Problem of Overriding Freedom (2): What Law Can Do to Help Keep a
Better Balance
As explained above, this section explores some legal options to help keep a better
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balance of interests between right-holders and content users within the field of DRM
technologies.183
The following first

explores

the possibility of repealing the

current

anti-circumvention regulations under certain conditions (5.1). It then explores some
legislative options under the basic frame of anti-circumvention regulations to help
reserving freedoms within the copyright regime (5.2). There are also brief discussions
about the possibility of “freedom enabled by DRM technologies.”
5.1

Choice (1): Repeal Legal Protection for DRM Technologies when Creating
Problems
If some of the DRM implementation diminishes the freedom within the copyright

regime, and if anti-circumvention regulations fix the problem by blindly protecting
these problematic DRM technologies in the market, one legislative option to help
reduce such problems is to repeal the legislation when fixing the problem.
One idea would be to legally protect DRM implementations only when they are
183
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well-balanced with regard to the interests of rights holders and users.184 In other words,
legislators can use anti-circumvention regulations as a tool to create incentives for
better-balanced DRM implementations.
Under this scheme, the challenge arises in the problem of drawing a clear line
between well-balanced DRM implementations worth protecting and unbalanced
implementations not worth protecting. If the line is ambiguous, there will be confusion
and chilling effects in the market, which may make regulations very costly in a
different sense. However, this problem of how to define a “well-balanced DRM
implementation” is not unique to this proposal. Rather, it is a common challenge when
legislators try to keep anti-circumvention regulations while also trying to minimize
their negative effects.
For example, with regard to the freedom of copyright use based on exceptions, the
problem of defining “well-balanced DRM implementations” has many similarities to
the problem of creating proper and clear carve-outs within anti-circumvention
regulations, as discussed below.185 If the exceptions or carve-outs for the freedom of
copyright can be defined clearly enough to avoid confusion in the course of DRM
184
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implementation, there would be no significant additional chilling effect of law that
protects only DRM implementations that respect those exceptions and carve-outs.
Still, this legislative choice requires careful study for proper exceptions on the
impact on technological research and development, because even a well-balanced
DRM implementation may need to be circumvented for legitimate research purposes.
5.2

Choice (2): Try to Keep Balance Within the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations
If legislators decide to maintain the main framework of the anti-circumvention

regulations as it is now, the next question is to consider any possible means to
minimize the negative impact caused by the maintained anti-circumvention regulations.
The major legal means is to establish proper statutes of exceptions and carve-outs to
the anti-circumvention regulations. In addition, stating some of the copyright
exceptions (such as fair use) as an affirmative right instead of a defense may help the
interests of copyright users to be better represented in the market of DRM
implementations.
In the following, this article first explores the option of creating legal exemptions
to give a right to hack when there is a legitimate need (5.2.1). Next, it gets into the
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question of how to realize freedom without recognizing a right to hack, which means
to respect the freedom within DRM schemes (5.2.2). As a premise to this discussion,
this article first analyzes whether the freedom incorporated within the copyright
regime can be embodied within DRM schemes (5.2.2.1). It suggests at the end that,
barring a higher transaction cost for users, similar freedom could be materialized by
combining systems based on computers and human institutions. Given such
possibilities, this Section proceeds to describe three possible legal options to help
realize balanced DRM systems (5.2.2.2).
5.2.1

A Right to Hack: Legal Exemption to Anti-circumvention Regulations

Although it sounds rather drastic, the idea of giving a right to hack is ready used in
the current anti-circumvention regulations.186 Exemption statutes in both U.S. and
Japanese anti-circumvention regulations allow people to hack DRM technologies or to
provide circumvention devices under certain conditions. Therefore, giving a right to
hack is an established way of minimizing the negative effect of anti-circumvention
regulations. It is a means that can respond to the freedom to use copyrighted materials
when allowed under traditional copyright regulations, as well as the freedom of
research and development in the field of DRM technologies. In fact, the DMCA has
186
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exceptions that respond to both of these problems, although narrowly tailored.187
The important question in this approach is the scope and the manner of the
exemptions. One of the major criticisms of the DMCA is its narrowness, and the
ambiguities and complexities of its statutory exemptions. For example, there is no
clear reason why encryption research and other fields of research related to DRM
technologies could be reasonably discriminated against in Section 1201 (g).188 In
Japan, there is no distinction in the exempted area of research. 189 An equally
important issue is the manner of articulating exception rules, i.e., its clearness and
simplicity. Complex and unclear manners of exceptions cause chilling effects and
eliminate opportunities for legitimate content use and technological research and
development.

190
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anti-circumvention regulations every four years, there is an opportunity in the future to
correct such narrowness, complexities and ambiguities if the government wishes.
The good thing about the right-to-hack approach is the flexibility it provides the
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beneficiaries. There is no restriction on how to circumvent the DRM technologies, as
opposed to the freedom incorporated within DRM systems approach described
below.191 The transaction costs for users to circumvent DRM systems, and for DRM
providers to allow such circumvention, are both generally lower than to incorporate
tools for freedom within DRM systems. Users do not need to go through the
procedures to achieve freedom incorporated within DRM systems; they have only to
look for circumvention tools when they think it is legitimate. On the DRM providers’
side, the costs are also lower, as they do not have to prepare a tool or procedure to
allow user freedoms within their DRM systems. They just have to let users make their
own decisions, and exercise their rights when they think it is proper. Therefore, this
approach might be better than the system described below.
Again, some cultural differences in how comfortable people feel asserting their
exceptions and how right-holders feel about trusting the general public may have some
impact on the policy decision in this aspect. 192 In any event, it is desirable for
legislators to make exemption statutes clear to avoid misjudgment.
There are some downsides in giving a right to hack. Many right-holders are still
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afraid of the risk of abuse by broadly authorizing the right to hack, and there should be
considerable work to get over such fears. Also, for technologically non-savvy people, a
right to hack is not very helpful without authorized circumvention tools. In order to
solve this problem, the government could provide some exceptions in anti-device
regulations to allow people an opportunity to use circumvention devices for legitimate
purposes.
5.2.2

Support Freedom Incorporated within DRM Systems

Another

legislative

means

is

to

legally

support

or

encourage

DRM

implementations to be freedom-friendly without giving people an instant right to hack.
In other words, under this approach, freedom would be enabled within the usage rules
of DRM systems (coded freedom), or freedom would be granted after some procedures
with an institution that authorizes circumvention (institutionalized freedom).193 Coded
freedom and institutionalized freedom can be combined to enable a proper and
cost-efficient design of freedom within a particular DRM system.194
5.2.2.1

Freedom within DRM systems?
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First, it is necessary to examine the possibility of including within the DRM
system some of the freedom defined in the copyright law.
There are two possible ways to incorporate freedom into DRM systems: one is to
program it into computer software (or, in some cases, hardware) (coded approach) and
the other is via human intervention (institutionalized approach). The bottom line is that
one can mimic some of the freedom set forth in the copyright law by combining a
coded approach and an institutionalized approach. 195 The following will briefly
explain what coded and institutionalized approaches are, their differences, pros, and
cons, and an example of how coded and institutionalized approaches can work
together.
Because freedom via DRM systems inherently includes monitoring and judgments
regarding the use of copyrighted works, this type of freedom-delivery system creates
primary concerns about privacy issues. Although privacy issues are outside the scope
of this research, it is worth noting that the system design should be privacy-sensitive,
and that such privacy concerns can be mitigated to a certain extent by the structure of
privacy-related data management.196
195
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5.2.2.1.1

Coded Approach

Here, a coded approach is referred to as any kind of automated systems generated
by computers and which realize a part of or all the requirements for the free uses of
copyrighted works recognized within copyright law.197 Such freedom includes: fair
use or other copyright statutory exceptions, freedom to use materials in the public
domain, and any part of the requirements for such freedom that can be coded into a
computer or a DRM system.
Michael Miron, the CEO of ContentGuard, Inc., thinks that some freedom can be
situation-specifically coded:
[Y]ou can use, for example, the MPEG well to create a license grant to
mimic fair use for particular domains. And they will be specific to
particular types of implementations. An example would be to give a
grant for all students registered at an academic institution for a
particular time period during a semester, and for professors or librarians
to grant certain distribution… rights to any student registered for the
academic year. So you can mimic certain uses for academic institutions.
But this could be domain specific....
enable transactions regarding copyrighted work, especially over the Internet. Even in such cases,
however, privacy concerns can be reduced by avoiding aggregating data beyond what is necessary. This
is because privacy concerns increase by relating different kinds of data to each other, especially together
with data that allows the identification of people. For example, credit card information, name or other
personal identification, and how the copyrighted work is used can all be maintained separately in
independent databases, and connected to each other only through an anonymous number and processed
separately by different people or departments. Therefore, in this research, the following discussion is
based on the assumption that privacy concerns can be reduced to a tolerable level by the system design.
For a theory of a system with data confidentiality, see, Adi Shamir, How to Share a Secret, 22
Communications of the ACM, 612 (1979).
197
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The same is true for first sale, where a rights expression involving
lending, transfer, and delegation can be created. There is a notion of
meta-rights, or rights about rights. I have a right to grant or I have a
right to revoke, and so I could construct certain license grants that
delegate the right to do all the things, like you mimic first sale. Again,
domain specific, and you have to strike a deal with content players for
particular distribution models.198
However, you cannot code every kind of freedom as is stated in law. Generally,
coded approach is more suitable to materialize requirements that are defined in a rather
specific manner. For example, personal noncommercial recording of TV programs for
time-shifting is recognized as one form of fair use in the U.S.199 Article 30 of the
Copyright Law of Japan also states that private copying within the home environment
is exempt from copyright infringement. Therefore, if you wish, DRM implementers
can code into their DRM systems a tool to allow users to make a copy for the purpose
of such time-shifting or private copying. Such usage rules may include usage beyond
the freedom authorized by copyright law, and thus partly be based on licenses.
However, it is clear at the same time that part of it is to materialize the freedom or
exemption authorized by copyright law.200
198
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is generally thought very difficult to codify a general principle of fair use.202
It would be relatively easier to code rather specific exemptions with particular
requirements and settings. In this sense, Japanese copyright statutory exemptions have
an advantage over the U.S. fair use doctrine. However, even Japanese exemptions are
not designed to be programmed into DRM systems, and thus leave many uncertainties
or ambiguities to be cleared in order to be implemented into DRM systems. Still, such
clarification would require less work compared with more general principles such as
fair use.
In addition, coded approach has its own limits. Building a computer system can be
too costly, and computers are generally not good at identifying the purpose or context
of use. Thus, it might be economically feasible to delegate some or all parts of the
process to human intelligence, which this article refers to as the institutionalized
approach below.
5.2.2.1.2

The Institutionalized Approach

The institutionalized approach is defined here as a system that uses human
judgment (along with some technological assistance, if necessary) to realize freedom
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or part of its requirements. This approach to freedom is based on the idea that human
judgment can supplement what is too difficult or costly for computers (i.e., the coded
approach). A well-known example of this institutionalized freedom would be the key
escrow approach that Burk and Cohen propose. They describe a system in which DRM
providers would escrow decryption keys or circumvention devices in a trusted
third-party organization so that people who want to make fair use can seek the DRM
key online.203
The institutionalized approach can also be more limited in scope than is suggested
by Burk and Cohen. For example, it can be used to authenticate only one rather than
all of the requirements. The Copyright Law of Japan, for example, allows school
textbook publishers and educational-television program-producers to use published
materials with a fair amount of compensation. 204 An institution can handle the
authentication process of the beneficiaries of these copyright exceptions (e.g.,
authorized school-textbook publishers) to hand out circumvention devices to enable
their permitted use, but the institution need not necessarily check the actual uses of the
copyrighted materials. The review of whether such uses are within the scope of
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statutory limitation can be delegated to the normal court procedure, for example. Or, in
a different system design, the coded approach might be used to authenticate the
beneficiary, and the institutionalized approach for the review of use.
In the following section, this research will compare general differences between
coded freedom and institutionalized freedom, and explore how these two can be
combined to make copyright exceptions available under DRM and anti-circumvention
regulations.
5.2.2.1.3

Choosing between the Coded and Institutionalized Approaches—An
Example

When one combines both the coded approach and the institutionalized approach,
many forms of copyright limitation can be materialized within the DRM system.
Overall, it is true that more transaction costs would be placed on users compared to the
analog world, as the de facto starting point is under the DRM control.205 Still, one can
at least claim that it is better to have some system that opens up a legitimate way to
secure freedom than none. Therefore, in the following, this article lists several issues to
be considered when trying to design a system that enables freedom recognized in the
205
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copyright law.
Choosing between the coded approach using computers and the institutionalized
approach using human powers, or deciding how to combine these two, can be done by
comparing the efficiencies and costs of each approach.206
The first step in determining which approach to use is to break down the
exemption rules into a set of relatively clear requirements. As previously stated,
system designers would face great difficulties when they tried to break down the U.S.
fair use principle into a set of clearer rules. More specific statutory exemptions,
however, such as some of those in the Copyright Law of Japan, are relatively easier to
analyze and program.
For example, Article 33 of the Copyright Law of Japan allows school textbook
publishers to quote published works “to the extent deemed necessary for the purpose
of school education,” along with a reasonable compensation, the amount of which is
fixed by the Commissioner of the Agency for Cultural Affairs (a governmental body in
charge of copyright regulation). This Article can be broken down to four requirements:
(i)

the subject of the use should be publishers of textbooks authorized by the
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Ministry of Education and Science;
(ii)

the object of the use should be works already made public;

(iii)

the purpose and manner should be deemed necessary for school education;
and

(iv)

the quoting publishers should pay the amount of compensation designated
by the Commissioner of the Agency of Cultural Affairs.

The next step is to ask whether computers can process each of the requirements set
forth in the above process. This is because, if a requirement is practically very difficult
or too costly for computers to clear, there is no choice left for system designers but to
leave the requirement to human institutions.
To elaborate more, computers are generally good at processing a large amount of
data, if such data can be properly prepared and the rules of processing are properly
programmed. However, computers have some limits on their capacities: they are
usually not good at processing the purposes of uses that people have in their minds, or
usage contexts that require complex judgments. Of the four requirements set forth in
Article 33, for example, the purpose and manner of the use in requirement (iii) would
be very costly or nearly impossible for computers to decide. Therefore, a reasonable
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choice is to leave this part of requirement to some human institution.
On the other hand, other requirements under Article 33 can be processed by both
computers and by human institutions. In such cases, the next question is which
approach, coded or institutionalized, will cost less. There are two kinds of costs
involved when the systems are designed: costs of regular processing and costs of
irregular results. There are also two or three parties involved: system providers (and
right-holders) and system users. The ideal choices should be the ones in which costs
are affordable and preferably low for every party involved. However, in some cases,
one choice would put more burden on one party while benefiting the other party more.
In such a case, the choice is more of a policy question, which legislators have to
decide.
The regular costs for running each system may include costs such as the following:
(a) Initial cost for building and installing the system. For example, authentication or
validation of the qualified textbook publishers can be done by matching a user ID
and the data of qualified publishers. The cost of handing out the user IDs and
building the database of qualified publishers, and the cost of matching these two,
should be calculated and compared between the computer-based process and the
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human-based process.
(b) Running cost of the system: for the coded approach, the maintenance and update
fee, and for the institutionalized approach, the labor cost of running and updating
the institution.
(c) The cost related to system changes in the long run: flexibility of changes that could
be made according to the possible change in rules in the future, or in order to make
improvements in the system. For larger and more drastic changes, the computer
system might cost more than in human institutions, which could respond by
revising the working manuals and retraining the human resources.
(d) The cost on the user’s side: ease and clarity of the user interface or its process,
availability of the system, and consistency or accuracy of rule application and
judgment. Generally, if programmed properly with accurate data, computers are
good at giving consistent and accurate application with more availability. However,
the ease of use greatly depends upon the user interfaces, which varies between the
systems. Also, the access cost may depend upon the system design: if access to a
coded system is made easily available over the Internet, for example, it may be
lower than access costs to human institutions, which often has time restraints as
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well as stricter capacity restraints. However, if the coded system is poorly designed,
again, the system would end up having a human-based customer-support system.
In such a case, it may be less expensive in the end for both the users and the system
to provide only the institutionalized system.
The next group of costs to be considered is the irregular cost, or risk, of running
the system. For example, such costs may include issues such as:
(a) Risk of making errors when building the system: This can also be viewed as the
flip side of costs in breaking down the statutory requirements into a programmable
form. Thus, there would be a role for legislators or the government, as described
below, to clearly state the requirements in a more programmable way to avoid this
risk and cost.
(b) Risk of misapplying the system to each case: both humans and computers can be
tricked by potential infringers; and the system can malfunction. In addition, human
judgment is more vulnerable to bias than the binary judgments of computers.
(c) Cost of correcting the abovementioned errors.
Apart from how easily mistakes can be made, there is always a question of which
party takes primary responsibility when talking about designing the type of system that
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Burk and Cohen suggest.207 The players can be right-holders, users, or third parties.
This question involves two issues. One is the problem of the potential bias of the
system designer. This is more prominent in the institutionalized approach: however,
the same problem exists for the coded approach. The other is the transaction costs of
achieving exempted uses.
For example, if users have the primary responsibility in designing or using the
system for exempted uses, there is always a risk of users biasing the system in their
favor, which may result in infringement and damage to right-holders. However, such
risk involves a trade-off regarding transaction costs. The transaction costs of getting an
exemption borne by users are, in many cases, much lower compared to other system
designs for which the primary decision makers are other parties and thus may require
additional steps by users to seek decisions from those responsible for it. The
right-to-hack approach 208 taken by the DMCA and Japanese anti-circumvention
regulations can be viewed as an extreme example of a design in which users exercise
the power of primary judgment, because they both allow users to create and use
circumvention devices based on their own judgment.
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On the other hand, there can be a system design in which the primary responsibility
for making decisions within the system (such as rule design and application) rests with
right-holders. In this case, the risk of infringement would be low. Rather, there is a risk
that right-holders will disrespect the exempted freedoms of users. For example, the EU
Copyright Directive of 2001 takes this approach in several cases, especially with
content distribution in on-demand download services along with a contract. As Article
6 Section 4 Subsection 4 of the EU Copyright Directive makes clear, Member States
cannot take any legislative means to secure copyright limitation when right-holders
decide to take that particular business model.209 This means that the EU Copyright
Directive leaves to right-holders the decision of whether they will provide a system
that recognizes copyright limitations.
The least biased design is to give primary responsibility to a neutral third party. It
could be an existing institution such as the courts, or it could be new organizations
with simpler procedures and lower costs.210 Thus, freedom might be better secured
while lowering the risk of infringement. However, this could be the choice with higher
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transaction costs for both users and right-holders, because both must be involved in
some process to deal with the parties making decisions. These costs can be lowered to
a certain extent, and should be made as low as possible,211 but they would not be zero.
Also, the problem of how to finance the institution would become a more urgent issue
than whom to delegate the decision to, right-holders or users.
Another issue to be considered in the course of system design is: when to make the
screening and judgment of each requirement. Taking the example of the quotation
again, there can be four phases to making judgments and screenings for each
requirement. The first is before the decoding of applied DRM on the work to be
quoted; the second is after the decoding and before the actual editing such as copying
and pasting; the third is after the editing and before publishing; and the fourth is after
the publication of the quoting works.
Decoding DRM

Editing (Cut, paste, mix)

Publication of
the quoted work

The earlier the filtering judgment, the safer right-holders may feel, because it
minimizes the chance of abuse. However, it also means that, from the viewpoint of
freedom and creativity, early filtering activities reduce the chance of experiment,
learning, and innovation, and thus reduce their benefits. Again, the risk of infringement
211
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and the chance of new innovation involve many common processes, and the difference
largely depends upon issues such as context, intention of the editors, and the manner of
use or publication, which is sometimes difficult to decide before it is finally published.
Generally speaking, possible damage to right-holders is caused by publication and
dissemination of the infringing works. Therefore, before the quoting works are
published and disseminated, it might be better to do the filtering as late as possible in
order to respect the possibilities for experimenting, learning, and innovating. There
could be even a system design in which all the filtering and judgment were done at the
very end, i.e., after publication, which has been the rule in the analog world.212
If the system integrators opt for review after publication, such ex ante review could
possibly be done using a coded system, an institutionalized system, or a combination
of the two. For example, if a DRM provider decided to allow editing and quoting using
an editing software program that decodes the DRM but integrates an anonymous ID
number with a watermark,213 a pilot program could be developed to search for cases
212
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of clear violation for works already published.214 Still, such a pilot program could not
understand and make decisions regarding the context or content of the work, which
might need to be supplemented by human judgment in institutions, such as courts or
alternative dispute resolution systems, or even preliminarily by legal staff hired by
right-holders.
In sum, it is possible to incorporate the freedoms extant within the copyright
regime by combining coded and institutionalized systems even though the resulting
freedoms would not be exactly the same as in the non-DRM world. Both the coded and
institutionalized systems have their pros and cons, and the system designer should pay
attention to the characteristics of each system to design a system with lower costs for
users, right-holders, and system providers.
However, the ability to provide such systemized freedom does not guarantee that it
will be provided in the real world. System integrators, most of whose primary
customers are right-holders and content providers, may not have an instant market
management of ID-related information should be designed appropriately. See, e.g., J. Feigenbaum et al.,
Privacy Engineering for Digital Rights Management Systems, 2320 Lecture Notes in Computer Sci., 76
(2002).See, also, Shamir, supra note 196. As another solution to privacy concerns, an effort to get
consent from users may be required. See, e.g., J. Alex Halderman, Brent R. Waters, and Edward W.
Felten, Privacy Management for Portable Recording Devices. Workshop on Privacy in Electronic
Society, November 2004, http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jhalderm/papers/wpes2004.pdf, (last visited
April 25, 2006).
214
There is also a problem of who would design the protocol of the pilot and review programs, because
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cause large chilling effects. It could be an area where government intervention is worth considering.
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incentive to design DRM systems with any integrated freedoms. Therefore, the next
Section discusses the government’s possible choices to help DRM systems be more
balanced by supporting the integration of coded and institutionalized freedoms.
5.2.2.2

Legal Option supporting Coded and Institutionalized Approach for
Freedom

When thinking about the role of the government in helping system integrators keep
a better balance in DRM systems, decisions should be made, again, by comparing the
pros and cons caused by such government intervention. The following generally
describes what the government can do to help create balanced DRM systems, as well
as what it ought to avoid.
5.2.2.2.1

Make Freedoms the Affirmative Rights of Copyright Users

Probably the least intervening option to the market is to state user freedoms as
affirmative rights rather than defenses, and leave all implementation issues to the
market. One reason why market negotiation between right-holders and users (or their
representatives) cannot effectively incorporate the freedom within DRM systems is
because the freedom is recognized as a defense, while the interests of copyright
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holders are protected as rights, as mentioned above.215 This first option gives both
parties equal legal standing in order to help enable more balanced negotiations
between the interested parties, which would result in a more balanced implementation
of DRM usage rules. This option may or may not include changes of rules for free uses.
In some cases, government should clear up some vagueness or fuzziness in the rules of
freedom in order to reduce the transaction costs of judging the borders.
For example, Masaya Otsuka at Sony thinks that such a legislative change might
be helpful.
If you ask me the questions of whether such “authorization of freedom
as rights” will influence our negotiations with content owners, or
influence the design of DRM systems or devices, I would say it is
possible. If the rights are clearly stated as enforceable mandatory rights
(and agreements against these rights are invalid), it would definitely
have an impact. This is because we cannot sell products that infringe
consumers’ rights….216
However, Otsuka mentions that such user-friendly DRM may add some additional cost
to the device makers’ side. In this regard, he mentions the importance of the rules of
users’ rights being clear and relatively easy to implement.
From the viewpoint of technologists and device makers, we would
weigh (1) the amount of increased users’ merit against (2) increased
production costs. The problem of a cost increase can be solved if we use
simple and clear rules. If so, as a device maker, [stating exemptions as
215
216
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rights] is basically welcome. The difficult part would be to determine
the rules. For example, if we take the example of private copying, how
broad should it be, and what criteria should we use? Is it OK to give the
copies you personally made to your grandparents? How about friends?
What kind of information should we use to make decisions?217
On the other hand, Otsuka is a little skeptical when users’ rights are voluntary.
[I]f the rights are voluntary and waivable (or, when the nature or rights
are not clear), the impact could be subtle. Content owners can choose
not to use [user-friendly] DRM if they don’t like the offered terms…. In
such a case, device makers would develop their products with careful
attention to the expression of their advertisements and specifications (to
make sure that consumers understand the devices don’t respect the
freedoms stated as rights. If they understand and still buy them, could
we argue that they agreed to waive the rights?). However, situations
could be improved by business norms and free competition. Therefore,
even waivable rights may push the trend of user-friendly DRM.218
This concern that freedom is not being respected as much as expected is partly
experienced in Europe, where the 2001 EU Copyright Directive took a mixed
mandatory and voluntary approach to copyright exemptions with regard to
anti-circumvention regulations. Even though Article 5 of the EU Copyright Directive
clearly sets forth some exemptions that the member states are mandated to grant to
copyright users, it does not clearly state whether they are users’ rights or defenses. In
addition, Article 6 Paragraph 4 mandates member states to take “appropriate
measures” to ensure some of the exemptions for users set forth in Article 5 (which
217
218
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makes it sound as if they are rights).219 On the other hand, Article 6 also provides
several significant loopholes to right-holders: for example, if there is an agreement
between users and right-holders, such agreement takes precedence over stated
exemptions.220 This means that the possible rights stated in Article 5 are, in practice,
not considered mandatory but voluntary rights, or waivable rights by agreements. Also,
by choosing on-demand online download services with agreements, content
distributors are totally exempted from the obligation to pay attention to users’ rights.221
These escape routes in Article 6 have been criticized for significantly undermining the
meaning of Article 5.222 Therefore, making users’ rights optional may not be as
powerful to help balance the interests between right-holders and copyright users.
Therefore, it can be said that declaring some rights mandatory would help more in
guiding the market toward more-balanced DRM systems. However, a different concern
is raised by this idea of mandating users’ rights, mainly from the viewpoint of
protecting privacy and confidential information. As Michael Miron explains:
Someone suggested to us that we ought to build in, including into the
standards, a set of mandatory [users’] rights. You must have an
219
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involuntary grant that is available to anybody anytime. But as we
thought about it, we started to think “Well, gee, I have a document
called a PDF file. Do I really want to say that I have an involuntary
grant to read that? What happens … if the PDF carries my medical
records as if it is a novel?223
This concern is surely legitimate. The question, however, is not about whether any
of the ‘free uses’ recognized by copyright law should be a right; it is rather about the
scope of rights, or how to deal with conflicts with other rights such as privacy. As can
be seen below,224 even Miron agrees that some kind of freedoms, such as back-up
copies of purchased entertainment content, can be a right.
5.2.2.2.2

More Specific Carve-Out Provisions for Coded or Institutionalized
Approaches to Freedom

The more difficult question is: What kind of uses should be qualified as mandatory
rights and how detailed should the statute be? If the market took the institutionalized
approach rather than the coded approach, the rules of users’ rights could be stated
relatively generally, because the judgment would be made by human intelligence. In
fact, if the government decided to leave the rules as flexible as they are now, there
would be no other choice for the market but to opt for some form of institutionalized
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system to realize users’ rights. However, leaving all decisions to an institutionalized
system is relatively costly, as has been pointed out.225 This is because the institution
must make decisions similar to those made by the courts, and because users must take
extra steps to seek judgments, which will chill spontaneous uses and small-value
uses.226
Therefore, if the government wants to help ensure more voluntary freedoms within
DRM technologies that impose lower transaction costs on users, especially for systems
using the coded approach, it would be helpful either to have more detailed rules that
are easily coded or to delegate judgments.227
Michael Miron explains this point:
Fair use is a situation-specific defense against copyright infringement: it
is not a pre-determined set of rights as one normally thinks about rights.
As such, you cannot precisely define them in advance, although there
have been some carve-outs in Europe to define some things.228 I’ve
suggested to the U.S. government that they do the same thing. [They]
said it’s kind of hard to do, so I don’t see a safe harbor anytime soon,
although that’s more of the possibilities to assist systems
implementers.229
Miron elaborates the idea of providing carve-outs, using an example of making
225
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back-up copies in the U.S.
[T]he government could assist system implementers by carving out
specific uses. For example, if the government said “it is legal to make
one backup copy.”… you just now gave a safe harbor to systems
designers, who could put a copy counted one in a backup mode, maybe
tied to domains. [There are] a lot of different ways to implement it
depending on devices. But if they said “That is an appropriate fair use,
so go ahead,” then, that’s an example.… Is a backup a violation?
Unknown. It clearly is an expectation by a lot of consumers, but under
the law it is not clear whether it passes the test [of fair use]. So that is an
example of something that the government, if they wanted to, could
carve out and say that’s a safe harbor.230
Tom Jacobs, Director of Research, Voodoo Sciences, Vanguard: Media
Architecture & Technology Project at Sun Microsystems Laboratories agrees that the
government may need to make the balanced rules clear. As Jacobs states:
I hate to say we need more government, and you probably don’t want
[the government to mandate technologies]. I think probably what you
want are more defined guidelines as to what is inbounds and what’s out
of bounds. What would be considered breaking copyright, and what
would be considered fair use….231
Another issue to be considered by the government is how finely the government
defines users’ freedoms. The fineness of the rules might bias the market’s choice of the
manner of implementation. This is because of the limits of computer abilities and costs
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with the coded approach, as explained above. 232 The more general, the more
situation-dependent, or the more context-dependent the rules become, the more likely
it is that the market would opt for the institutionalized approach. On the other hand, if
the rules are relatively specific without any substantial decisions about the context or
substance of the use, the market can take the coded approach, too.
5.2.2.2.3

Specify Coded or Institutionalized Approaches to Freedom by Law

In addition to more finely defining the rules of users’ rights for the market to
explore the opportunities for coded or institutionalized freedom, the government can
step further into the manner of implementation to mandate specific coded or
institutionalized freedom. While the previous option is just to make clear what the
requirements for mandatory users’ rights are and leave the concrete implementation of
the market (i.e., what part should be realized by the coded approach, and what others
by the institutionalized approach, for example), this option is to specify what should be
coded and what should be institutionalized.
Even though this sounds as if the government is intervening significantly, and it
probably is, there is already legislation that has taken this approach. For example, the
U.S. Audio Home Recording Act is an example that clearly states that devices should
232
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take the coded approach for back-up copies.233 On the other hand, the EU Copyright
Directive of 2001 is said to take a modified key-escrow approach, which is one form
of the institutionalized approach. 234 Article 6 Paragraph 4 of the EU Copyright
Directive mandates Member States as follows:
… in the absence of voluntary measures taken by right-holders,
including agreements between right-holders and other parties concerned,
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that
right-holders make available to the beneficiary of an exception or
limitation provided for in national law … the means of benefiting from
that exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that
exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to
the protected work or subject-matter concerned.235
According to the Commentary on European Copyright Law, the above Article is
interpreted to allow, in certain cases, that Member States can require content providers
to provide content users with circumvention devices or services.236
Because the government intervention always gives some bias to the market, the
government should avoid as much as possible mandating anything harmful or costly to
technological innovation when government decides to take this approach. For example,
legislation that requires system integrators to integrate “all the freedoms that are
233
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available under the copyright law” into their DRM systems may be harmful rather than
helpful, because it may be unclear and thus prohibitively costly to decide what “all the
freedoms” means. Rather, the government should make more of an effort to specify or
list the freedoms that should be respected even within the DRM world.
Another thing that many technologists want the government to avoid, when
stepping into a coded approach to freedom (or codes in general) is to mandate
implementation of specific technology specifications. For example, Noboru Tohyama
at Fujitsu, among others, clearly states this problem from two different directions:
I don’t want the government to mandate technological standards,
because that would trouble the department of technological research and
development. It would also be problematic to regulate devices that
would not react to DRM systems. There are only two ways to do so:
either they specify the technologies and mandate to incorporate them; or
you have to make your devices respond to every possible DRM system
available, which would require unlimited effort. Either way, I don’t
want to see it happen.237
It might be possible under some circumstances that government would specify the
freedom to be coded, but without determining the actual specifications of the
technologies. Determining the actual specifications should be left to the market, as
many have already pointed out.238
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With regard to institutionalized freedom, there could be a diversity of levels of
government intervention. The government could set guidelines of what should be
followed by institutions and leave their formation and governance to the market.239
The other extreme example would be that the government itself run the institution.240
Or, alternatively, the government could seek applications from private entities to
handle the processes in question, designate or approve appropriate groups, and
supervise their operation.241 Also, as discussed above, it is important to notice that the
issue of who takes control over the organization would impact the fairness of the
judgment.242
As described above, the government would always bias the market by how detailed
its requirements for the freedoms incorporated into DRM systems were.243 Whether
further government involvement in system implementation is necessary or desirable
should be left for later research, with more study on how the market can properly
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realize the rules of users’ rights set by the government, as well as the possible negative
impacts of government’s imposing specific system designs.
6.

Conclusion
This article has shown that the problem of DRM systems overriding freedoms of

copyright uses incorporated within the copyright regime are largely coming from the
unbalanced

implementation

of

DRM

technologies,

and

that

the

current

anti-circumvention regulations have fixed this problem by blindly prohibiting one
means of solution: i.e., circumvention of DRM technologies that cause the problems.
This research also shows that the anti-circumvention regulations are causing chilling
effects and other negative impacts on scientific research regarding DRM technologies.
By comparing anti-circumvention regulations between the U.S. and Japan, this
research shows that the implementation made in the DMCA is not the only solution:
rather, it shows that a more modest implementation like in Japan can be possible and
desirable. In order to support such limited implementation, this research also revisits
the rationale behind anti-circumvention regulations and shows that legally prohibiting
the circumvention of DRM systems may not be important to stop piracy and to support
content business as it first appears.
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This research also shows, based on actual voices of key players in the market, that
the market would not function efficiently to implement within the DRM systems the
freedom of copyright use incorporated within the copyright law. This is because there
is imbalance in legal standings between right-holders and users; the mindset and/or
ability of the right-holders who have the power to decide the implementation rules are
not ready to respect the freedoms; and also because the voices of users are currently
not well represented in the market. After such extensive market analysis, this research
terns to see what law can do to help to bring DRM systems more balanced. It suggests
two solutions: repeal anti-circumvention regulations when DRM systems are
imbalanced, and keep proper balance within the framework of anti-circumvention
regulations. The latter choice can be broken down to two options. One is to give a
properly-tailored “right to hack” when there is legitimate reason to do so. The other is
to incorporate tools to embody freedom within the DRM system without giving a right
to hack. This research shows by using a concrete example that many of the freedoms
can be incorporated into DRM systems by combining coded approach using computer
systems and institutionalized approach using human intelligence. At the end, this
research provides three legal option to support freedom to be incorporated within the
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DRM system: to declare the freedoms as affirmative (and preferably mandatory) rights
of users to give users equal legal standings; to establish more detailed and clear carve
out provisions to make it easy for DRM systems to implement; and to specify the
actual manner of implementation by law. It also points out what the government has to
pay attention in order to avoid market confusion when taking these steps: the most
important one is to make the rule clear enough, as well as to avoid mandating
particular technological specifications.
A decade has passed since the 1996 WIPO treaties has brought a significant change
to the world of copyright. And we have seen more than enough problems in these new
technologies and regulations. Hopefully this research has provided an opportunity to
understand why the efforts in the DRM technologies have been rather painful for both
right-holders and copyright users, and to show some steps to improve the current legal
and market situation to realize a better-balanced world of copyright with DRM
technologies.
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